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I.

INTRODUCTION

Medical device sales representatives play a unique role in the
delivery of treatment to the patient as compared to pharmaceutical
sales representatives. Medical device representatives are often in
the operating room or present during the patient visit and can
provide pretreatment technical information about the device.
While this unique role can provide great benefit to the
manufacturer, the physician, and the patient, it can also expose a
manufacturer and the sales representative to liability. Once limited
to basic tort claims, such as negligence for failure to warn or
invasion of privacy, the avenues for sales representative liability
have blossomed over the last few years. Counsel for a medical
device manufacturer (both in-house and outside counsel) must
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become familiar with a broader range of claims. This article gives
readers an overview of the expanded theories of liability for
medical device representative conduct with an emphasis on recent
and novel claims, as well as successful defenses to these claims. In
order to aid counsel in better understanding the nuances and
challenges presented in defending these new claims involving sales
representatives, this article uses specific case examples drawn from
recent experience.
There are two primary reasons for the increase in claims
involving medical device sales representatives. First, as is widely
recognized, the U.S. government has increased its enforcement
actions against the healthcare industry, including medical device
and pharmaceutical manufacturers.
More recently, the
government has focused on the prosecution of individuals under
the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Sales managers and
directors have been included as targets in these governmentalenforcement actions. This increase in government actions against
medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers with a focus on
responsible corporate officers has given rise to a similar increase in
civil products liability actions based on the government actions.
This article explores the government’s recent use of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine as applied in pharmaceutical
and medical device prosecutions and explores several recent
examples where medical device sales managers or directors were
1
prosecuted by the U.S. government with mixed results. This
article also discusses recent products liability cases based on
government-enforcement actions involving allegations related to
2
sales representatives. Finally, this article addresses evidentiary
issues in products liability cases where there is a parallel
3
government prosecution.
The second primary reason for the increase in claims involving
medical device sales representatives is the U.S. Supreme Court’s
4
recent decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., in which the Court held
that the Medical Device Amendments precluded state law tort
claims challenging the design, manufacture, or labeling of Class III
medical devices approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) via the premarket approval process. Since the Riegel
1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.D.
552 U.S. 312 (2008).
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decision, plaintiffs have attempted to assert novel claims to avoid
preemption by focusing on the alleged conduct of sales
representatives. This article discusses the application of the Riegel
decision to allegations involving medical device sales
5
representatives.
This article also examines novel negligence
allegations involving sales representative conduct asserted in an
6
attempt to avoid preemption under Riegel.
Included in this
discussion is a brief overview of the implications of state laws
regarding the unauthorized practice of medicine and their relation
to negligence claims involving medical device sales representatives.
As a defense strategy, medical device manufacturers often seek
to remove cases to federal court based on federal diversity
jurisdiction. However, the naming of a typically in-state sales
representative as an individual defendant in an attempt to avoid
Riegel preemption serves the dual purpose of potentially defeating
diversity jurisdiction for the out-of-state manufacturer. In those
cases, defendants may argue that the sales representative was
fraudulently joined. Interestingly, if the sales representative is
considered a “seller” or “distributor” under state products liability
law, the sales representative could be held strictly liable for device
defects, such that the sales representative would not be fraudulently
joined and there would be no federal diversity jurisdiction. This
article explores the application of various state products liability
statutes as applied to sales representatives in the fraudulent joinder
7
context.
Finally, this article tackles recently asserted defenses to
allegations involving sales representative conduct as well as ultimate
8
case outcomes. Case studies provide specific examples of the most
prevalently asserted and successful defenses to claims involving
sales representative conduct. This article analyzes the new ways
that classic defenses are currently being used, including application
of the learned intermediary doctrine, absence of duty, captain of
9
the ship doctrine, and lack of causation. In particular, this article
addresses the application of these defenses in recent trials involving
sales representative conduct.

5. See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D.
Fla. 2009); see infra Part III.A–B.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. Id.
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II. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST MEDICAL
DEVICE SALES MANAGERS AND DIRECTORS
The increase in government prosecution of individual officers
of pharmaceutical and medical device companies, including sales
managers and directors, is one factor that is leading to an increase
in sales representative products liability cases. The government has
based its prosecution of these individuals on the responsible
10
corporate officer doctrine.
While the doctrine is generally
utilized in the prosecution of corporate executive officers and
other high ranking officials, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
expanded its enforcement of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine to other corporate officers and employees, including sales
managers, directors, and even sales representatives. Courts have
generally approved this extension of the responsible corporate
officer doctrine, and hefty fines and even prison sentences have
11
been levied on these corporate officers.
Although the recent
landmark Second Circuit decision, United States v. Caronia,
reversing the conviction of a sales representative for off-label
12
promotion, may mark a shift in prosecutorial policy in the future.
Direct prosecution of medical device sales representatives is
still relatively rare; however, the filing of civil products liability
claims against medical device sales representatives based, at least in
part, on government enforcement actions has continued to grow.
Medical device products liability lawsuits involving sales
representatives can be based on government action as simple as an
13
FDA warning letter or as complex as a government prosecution of
10. See, e.g., Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(involving the prosecution of a pharmaceutical company senior corporate officer
convicted under the responsible corporate officer doctrine); United States v.
Huggins, No. 09-403-3, 2011 WL 6180623, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011)
(referencing the guilty plea of medical device corporate officer under the
responsible corporate officer doctrine); United States v. Higgins, No. 09-403-4,
2011 WL 6088576, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2011) (same); Hermelin v. K-V Pharm.
Co., 54 A.3d 1093, 1097 (Del. Ch. 2012) (referencing pharmaceutical corporate
officer’s guilty plea under the responsible corporate officer doctrine).
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).
13. An FDA warning letter is a communication sent by the FDA to the
product manufacturer notifying the manufacturer that there has been a violation
of FDA regulations. The warning letter identifies the violation and provides
guidance on how the company must correct the issue. See Inspections, Compliance,
Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda
.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm278624.htm (last updated
Dec. 8, 2011).
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the sales managers or directors. Plaintiffs’ attorneys use these
government enforcement actions as ammunition against both the
medical device company itself, as well as the sales representatives.
Products liability actions that involve medical device companies
subject to governmental action often raise challenging evidentiary
issues at trial. Plaintiffs hope to introduce evidence of corporate
wrongdoing through evidence of other bad acts, including
previously executed corporate integrity agreements and consent
14
decrees.
Defendants have challenged the admission of this
evidence with mixed results.
A.

Responsible Corporate Officer Liability Under the Park Doctrine

The government’s health care fraud prevention and
enforcement efforts set a new record in fiscal year 2011 with the
15
largest sum ever recovered in a single year. This statistic reflects
criminal and civil investigation and enforcement efforts by various
governmental entities on both the federal and state levels,
including, but not limited to, Offices of the State Attorneys
General, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the U.S. Department of Justice,
the Office of the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Congress, the FDA, and the
16
Department of Veterans Affairs. Recently, the focus has shifted
14. Corporate integrity agreements are agreements between the Office of
Inspector General for the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (OIG) and health care providers and other entities “as part of the
settlement of Federal health care program investigations arising under a variety of
civil false claims statutes. Providers or entities agree to the obligations, and in
exchange, OIG agrees not to seek their exclusion from participation in Medicare,
Medicaid, or other Federal health care programs.” Corporate Integrity Agreements,
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://oig.hhs
.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2013). Consent decrees are agreements that all parties agree to, which settle the
claims alleged against the individual or company where the individual or company
agrees to take specific actions without admitting fault or guilt. Consent decrees
have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees. Some issues are resolved by
consent of the parties (as in a contract) and some issues require judicial acts
rendered by the judge (as in judicial decrees).
15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Health Care Fraud Prevention and
Enforcement Efforts Result in Record-Breaking Recoveries Totaling Nearly $4.1
Billion (Feb. 14, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February
/12-ag-213.html.
16. In addition, during fiscal year 2011, task forces such as the Health Care
Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team, created to prevent fraud, waste,
and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and various Medicare Fraud
Strike Force Teams expanded local partnerships to prevent fraud. See id.
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from the prosecution of companies to targeting individual
17
executives, including sales executives.
Governmental legal authority for criminal and civil
investigations of pharmaceutical and medical device companies is
18
derived from several separate statutes and regulations.
Prosecutions are generally based on provisions and regulations of
19
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The concept of the
responsible corporate officer (RCO) originated with the U.S.
20
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Dotterweich.
In
Dotterweich, the president of a pharmaceutical company was
convicted of a misdemeanor for shipping adulterated and
21
misbranded drugs in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
found in Dotterweich that a corporate official could be convicted of a
misdemeanor under the FDCA if he or she had a “responsible
share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute
outlaws, namely, to put into the stream of interstate commerce
22
adulterated or misbranded drugs.”
The potential for RCO liability further developed in the
23
Supreme Court decision United States v. Park.
In Park, Acme
Markets President, John Park, was informed by the FDA of poor
conditions in his company’s warehouses in Philadelphia and
24
Baltimore, but the problems persisted.
The government
prosecuted Acme and Park for misdemeanor violations of food
25
26
adulteration.
Park was convicted and was fined $250.
His
conviction was reversed by the appellate court, but the Supreme
17. See Laurence Freedman, Three Guilty Pleas Under Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine Signal Heightened Enforcement, RX COMPLIANCE REP., Aug. 6, 2009, at
10; see, e.g., cases cited supra note 10; see also Michael J. Vanselow & Ann M.
Bildtsen, 2009—Healthcare Law Enforcement “Perfect Storm,” HEALTH LAW., Feb. 2010,
at 18, 22.
18. See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333
(2006 & Supp. 2011) (providing authority for government indictments, including
the unlawful marketing of medical devices, fraud on the FDA, and the distribution
of adulterated products); False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006)
(providing authority for civil action for false or fraudulent claims for payment and
other similar acts). States also have their own False Claims Act statutes and
consumer protection laws.
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331–350e.
20. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
21. Id. at 278.
22. Id. at 284.
23. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
24. Id. at 661–62.
25. Id. at 660, 682–83.
26. See id. at 666.
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Court reversed the appellate court and ordered Park’s conviction
27
be reinstated. The Supreme Court found in Park that the focus of
RCO liability lies not in where a corporate defendant’s position is
within the corporate hierarchy, but rather if the corporate
“defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation,
responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance,
or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he
28
failed to do so.”
The “Park doctrine,” as it has evolved and is in use today,
provides that a responsible corporate official can be held liable for
a first-time misdemeanor and a possible subsequent felony based
on a violation of the FDCA, without proof that the corporate
official acted with knowledge, intent, negligence, or even
29
participation in the specific offense.
The prosecution of a
responsible corporate official for a misdemeanor violation of the
30
FDCA, a “Park Doctrine prosecution,” is handled by the DOJ. The
FDA has found that a Park doctrine prosecution has a strong
deterrent effect on pharmaceutical and medical device companies
31
and other regulated entities.
In 2011, the FDA released a set of nonbinding criteria to be
used to evaluate RCO liability in connection with the Park doctrine,
32
referred to as the “Park Doctrine Criteria.”
When considering
whether to recommend a misdemeanor prosecution against a
corporate official, the FDA will consider “the individual’s position
in the company and relationship to the violation, and whether the
33
official had the authority to correct or prevent the violation.”
Further, the FDA does not find knowledge of and actual
participation in the violation to be prerequisites, but does consider
them factors that may be relevant when deciding whether to
34
recommend charging a misdemeanor violation. Other factors the
FDA will consider in determining whether to recommend a
misdemeanor prosecution against a corporate official include but
27. Id. at 666, 678.
28. Id. at 673–74.
29. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 6-5-3, at
6-49 to -50 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI
/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM074317.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. (listing “factors that may be relevant when deciding whether to
recommend charging a misdemeanor violation”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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are not limited to:
(1) [w]hether the violation involves actual or potential
harm to the public;
(2) [w]hether the violation is obvious;
(3) [w]hether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal
behavior and/or failure to heed prior warnings;
(4) [w]hether the violation is widespread;
(5) [w]hether the violation is serious;
(6) the quality of the legal and factual support for the
proposed prosecution; and
(7) [w]hether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use
35
of agency resources.
Today, the current penalties for responsible corporate officers
prosecuted under the Park doctrine include fines, probation, jail
36
In addition, the Department of
time, and FDA debarment.
Health and Human Services has the authority to exclude
individuals from federally funded governmental programs like
Medicare and Medicaid as a consequence of felony or
37
misdemeanor convictions for fraud and other misconduct.
B.

Prosecution of Sales Representatives, Managers, and Directors as
Responsible Corporate Officers

In a speech given at the 12th Annual Pharmaceutical
Regulatory and Compliance Congress on November 2, 2011,
Assistant Attorney General Tony West stated that “demanding
accountability means we will consider prosecutions against
individuals, including misdemeanor prosecutions under the Park
38
doctrine.” The following examples illustrate that the government

35. Id.
36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 333, 335a–335b (2006).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006). See also Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d
98, 100–02 (D.D.C. 2010) (excluding three pharmaceutical company executives
from participating in Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal healthcare programs
for twelve years due to their misdemeanor guilty pleas to charges they served as
“responsible corporate officers” who “had responsibility and authority either to
prevent in the first instance or to promptly correct certain conduct resulting in the
misbranding of Oxycontin” during a period in which the company admitted to
marketing Oxycontin with the intent to defraud or mislead, in violation of the
FDCA).
38. Tony West, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the 12th Annual
Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress (Nov. 2, 2011), available at
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/2011/civ-speech-111102.html.
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is prosecuting not only traditional executives under the responsible
corporate officer doctrine, such as chief executive officers, but also
less likely targets, including members of pharmaceutical and
medical device sales forces.
1.

United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC

In United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, the president, national
sales director, and two regional sales managers of Stryker were
indicted for wire fraud, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and
39
distribution of a misbranded device.
One executive was also
40
According to the
indicted for making false statements.
prosecution, the executives allegedly schemed to promote the
combined use of Calstrux, a bone void filler, and OP-1, a protein
that promotes bone growth, though the combination of the drugs
41
had not been approved by the FDA, in order to grow sales.
Prosecutors further alleged that patients reported adverse events
and that, after the executives were aware of these adverse events,
they continued to promote off-label and did not warn physicians of
42
the adverse events. During the trial of three of the executives and
the company, the company pled guilty to a misdemeanor and paid
43
a $15 million fine. Prosecutors subsequently dismissed all charges
against all four executives after reviewing documents that showed
44
the executives acted in good faith.
2.

United States v. Caputo

On February 4, 2003, the government brought a nineteencount indictment against three officers of AbTox, Inc., a
39. United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO, 2010 WL
2900684, at *1 (D. Mass. July 21, 2010); Superseding Indictment, Stryker Biotech,
No. 09-CR-10330-GAO (Oct. 11, 2011), 2011 WL 8612010; Indictment, Stryker
Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO (Oct. 28, 2009), 2009 WL 3612189.
40. Stryker Biotech, 2010 WL 2900684, at *1.
41. Id. at *1–2.
42. Id. at *5.
43. Verdict, Agreement and Settlement, Stryker Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO
(Jan. 17, 2012), 2012 WL 130887.
44. Assented to Motion to Dismiss, Stryker Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO,
(Feb. 2, 2012), ECF No. 309; Assented to Motion to Dismiss, Stryker Biotech, No. 09CR-10330-GAO (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 293; Assented to Motion to Dismiss,
Stryker Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO (Jan. 17, 2012), ECF No. 284; David
Voreacos, Stryker Official’s Charges Dropped as U.S. Cites New Evidence in Drug Case,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02
-02/stryker-official-s-charges-dropped-as-u-s-cites-new-evidence-in-drug-case.html.
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manufacturer of the Plazlyte sterilizer system, including the
45
director of marketing and vice president of regulatory affairs.
According to the indictment, the defendants agreed, combined,
and conspired to defraud the United States by selling an
adulterated and misbranded device to various U.S. government
agencies and representing that its sterilizer product had been
46
cleared by the FDA. The director of marketing, who was later
employed at AbTox as vice president of sales, pled guilty to
introducing into interstate commerce an adulterated and
47
misbranded device.
His plea agreement specifically stated that
“[a]s Director of Marketing, defendant . . . played an active role in
the overall effort by AbTox to sell the unapproved sterilizer. He
played a role in developing and implementing AbTox’s marketing
48
strategy, including its pricing and its promotional literature.”
“[D]efendant . . . also played a role . . . in devising AbTox’s
marketing strategy and in training AbTox’s sales and field
49
representatives to implement it.” The director of marketing was
ultimately sentenced to probation for three years and a fine of
50
$75,000.
3.

United States v. Donofrio

In United States v. Donofrio, a regional sales director for
Exactech, Inc., waived prosecution by indictment for knowingly
and willfully conspiring with others to violate the Anti-Kickback
51
Statute. Specifically, the regional sales director was charged with
offering payment to orthopedic surgeons for their use of certain

45. Indictment, United States v. Caputo, 456 F. Supp. 2d 970 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(No. 03CR0126), 2003 WL 23413059; see also United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp.
2d 912, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2003). See generally Caputo, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 981
(articulating the court’s reasons regarding the sentencing of defendants), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 517 F.3d 935, 944 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming judgment of
district court except with respect to restitution; the award of restitution was
vacated and the case remanded for calculation of the amount owed).
46. Indictment, supra note 45.
47. Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Schmitt, No. 03 CR 126-3 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 23, 2003), 2003 WL 25609246.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Sentencing Order at 3, Caputo, No. 1:03-cr-00126 (Aug. 22, 2006), ECF
No. 432.
51. Information at 1, United States v. Donofrio, No. 3:10-cr-00836-GEB
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2010), ECF No. 1.
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52

hip and knee devices. The information alleged that from 2002
through 2008, the regional sales director and coconspirators
offered and entered into consulting agreements with orthopedic
surgeons, which were designed to induce the surgeons to use and
53
purchase Exactech, Inc.’s hip and knee products. The regional
sales director pled guilty to conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback
54
Statute and was sentenced to five years probation and a $6000
55
fine.
4.

United States v. Caronia
56

a pharmaceutical sales
In United States v. Caronia,
representative for Orphan Medical, Inc. was charged with
introduction of a misbranded drug into interstate commerce,
57
healthcare fraud, and conspiracy to commit such violations.
Specifically, the indictment alleged that the defendant sales
representative knowingly and intentionally conspired with others to
58
misbrand the drug Xyrem by marketing it for off-label uses. The
sales representative was found guilty of engaging in the interstate
59
commerce of a misbranded drug. He was ultimately sentenced to
one year of probation, 100 hours of community service, and a $25
60
special assessment.
The sales representative appealed the conviction, arguing that
his right to free speech under the First Amendment was being
61
illegally restricted. On December 3, 2012, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s
conviction and vacated the criminal conviction of the sales
62
representative. The Second Circuit reasoned that the FDCA does
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
55. Judgment at 2, Donofrio, No. 3:10-cr-00836-GEB (Mar. 5, 2011), ECF No.
10; Plea Agreement at 2, Donofrio, No. 3:10-cr-00836-GEB (Dec. 7, 2010), ECF No.
5.
56. 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2012).
57. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gleason, No. 06-229 (ENV)
(E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007), 2007 WL 4185417.
58. Id.
59. Judgment at 1, Gleason, No. 06-229 (ENV) (Nov. 30, 2009), ECF No. 126.
60. Id. at 1, 4–5.
61. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 33, United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d
149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 09-5006-cr), 2010 WL 6351495.
62. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152.
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not criminalize “simple promotion” of a drug’s off-label use by a
sales representative because “such a construction would raise First
63
Amendment concerns.”
The court ultimately held that “the
government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and
their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the
64
lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.”
5.

United States v. Orthofix, Inc.

Orthofix, Inc., a manufacturer of a bone growth stimulator,
pled guilty to an information charging it with obstruction of a
federal audit for manipulating certificates of medical necessity, a
form required by Medicare to be signed by a physician attesting
65
that the bone growth stimulator was medically necessary. As part
of the plea agreement, Orthofix agreed to pay a $7.65 million
criminal fine and $34.23 million plus interest to resolve civil
66
allegations under the False Claims Act. In addition to this plea
agreement entered into by Orthofix, the investigation resulted in
felony charges against executives, employees, and contractors of
67
Orthofix. Specifically, a former Orthofix vice president of sales
pled guilty to paying kickbacks to induce a doctor and a physician’s
68
assistant to prescribe Orthofix products; a former Orthofix
regional sales director pled guilty to making a false declaration to a
69
grand jury about Orthofix conduct; and two former Orthofix
territory managers pled guilty to falsifying patients’ medical records
to fraudulently induce Medicare to pay for Orthofix bone growth
70
stimulators.
63. Id. at 160.
64. Id. at 169.
65. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Orthofix, Inc.
Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony (June 7, 2012) [hereinafter USAO
Orthofix Press Release], available at www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2012/June
/OrthofixSettlementPR.html.
66. See id. “The civil settlement resolves claims brought against Orthofix in a
whistleblower lawsuit filed under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act
that is pending in the District of Massachusetts: United States ex. rel. Bierman, v.
Orthofix International, N.V., et al., Civil Action No. 05-10557-EFH (D. Mass.).” Id.
67. See id.
68. Id.; see Plea Agreement, United States v. Guerrieri, No. 1:12-cr-10061RWZ (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2012), ECF No. 6.
69. USAO Orthofix Press Release, supra note 65; see also Plea Agreement,
United States v. Salzman, No. 1:11-cr-10385-RWZ (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2011), ECF
No. 7.
70. USAO Orthofix Press Release, supra note 65; see Plea Agreement, United
States v. McKay, No. 1:12-cr-10129-DJC (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 2; Plea
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Civil Products Liability Actions Based on Governmental Prosecution of
Responsible Corporate Officers

Just as government enforcement actions have recently focused
on corporate officers, including sales directors, so too have civil
products liability suits that incorporate or mimic these
enforcement actions. For example, in a government prosecution
against bone cement manufacturer Norian, Corp., four former
executives pled guilty, in 2009, to misdemeanor counts of shipping
adulterated and misbranded Norian XR bone cement in interstate
71
commerce. The indictment alleged that the former executives
conspired to conduct unauthorized clinical trials of Norian’s bone
cement in surgeries to treat vertebral compression fractures (VCFs)
72
of the spine without alleged FDA-required clinical testing. At least
three patients died during these allegedly unauthorized clinical
73
trials. All four executives received jail sentences of at least five
74
months and a fine of $100,000 each. The company pled guilty to
felony and misdemeanor criminal charges and paid a $23.5 million
75
fine.
As a direct result of this prosecution of the company and its
corporate officers, civil products liability suits have been filed. For
example, Eva Sloan, individually and as executrix of the estate of
Lois Eskind, sued Norian and Synthes, Inc. for fraud; conspiracy to

Agreement, United States v. Field, No. 1:12-cr-10057-JLT (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2012),
ECF No. 2; see also Electronic Clerk’s Notes, McKay, No. 1:12-cr-10129-DJC (May
11, 2012) (stating, in part, “Defendant enters plea of guilty”); Electronic Clerk’s
Notes, Field, No. 1:12-cr-10057-JLT (Mar. 22, 2012) (stating, in part, “Defendant
enters plea of guilty”).
71. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Penn., Former Executives
of International Medical Device Maker Sentenced to Prison in Unlawful Clinical
Trials Case (Nov. 21, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/2011
/Nov/synthesexecs_release.pdf.
72. Id. VCFs are a painful condition where the bones of the spine become
broken. It is commonly suffered by elderly individuals. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Bohner, No. 2:09cr-00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011), ECF No. 216; Judgment in a Criminal Case
at 2, United States v. Walsh, No. 2:09-cr-00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF
No. 187; Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Higgins, No. 2:09-cr00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF No. 186; Judgment in a Criminal Case at
2, United States v. Huggins, No. 2:09-cr-00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF
No. 185.
75. Sophia Pearson, Synthes Sued over Death Linked to Bone-Cement Trials,
BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012
-07-30/synthes-sued-over-death-related-to-unapproved-bone-cement-trial.html.
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commit fraud; willful, wanton, malicious, and reckless misconduct;
failure to warn; gross negligence; negligence per se; fraudulent
76
concealment; and wrongful death. Ms. Sloan’s complaint is based
on the same conduct at issue in the criminal investigations of the
company and its executives—specifically, that the alleged
unapproved clinical trial of bone cement caused the death of Lois
77
Eskind after a surgeon injected the bone cement into her spine.
78
The defendants have denied all allegations. Similarly, the families
of two other patients, who died during surgery that involved the use
of the bone cement, filed suit against the company and the four
former executives in California Superior Court alleging similar
79
claims.
These “me too” products liability lawsuits are anticipated for
the government enforcement actions against sales managers and
80
81
directors. For example, the United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC
enforcement action prompted the filing of products liability
lawsuits, including Cabana v. Stryker Biotech, LLC. In Cabana,
plaintiff April Cabana alleged she was injured by bone void filler
82
products. The plaintiff specifically referenced the guilty plea of
two Stryker Biotech sales representatives regarding the illegal
76. Complaint at 30–46, Sloan v. Synthes, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-04286-LDD (E.D.
Pa. July 27, 2012), ECF No. 1.
77. Id. at 30–31.
78. See Motion to Dismiss, Synthes, No. 2:12-cv-04286-LDD (Oct. 1, 2012), ECF
No. 7.
79. Complaint, Estate of Kikuchi v. Synthes, Inc., No. CIVMSC12-00518 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 29, 2012), ECF No. 1; see also Annie Reynolds, Families Sue Synthes
over Bone Cement Surgery Death, SHERIDAN & MURRAY LLC (Mar. 20, 2012), http://
www.philadelphiainjurylawyerblogs.com/families-sue-synthes-over-bone-cement
-surgery-deaths/.
80. See, e.g., Abtox Sterilization System May Hurt People’s Corneas, SILVERMAN &
FODERA, http://www.civilrights.com/AbtoxSterilizationSystem.php (last visited
Feb. 21, 2013) (advertising for personal injury suits related to the FDA warning
and recall of the AbTox Plazlyte Sterilization System that may cause serious
injuries to people’s corneas); Florida Hip Replacement Attorney, BERKE LAW FIRM, P.A.,
http://www.yourinjurylawyer.com/florida-hip-replacement-attorney/ (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013) (listing Exactech and Biomet as hip and knee
replacement manufacturers); Austin Kirk, Medtronic Infuse Lawyers Reviewing
Lawsuits for Bone Graft Problems, SAIONTZ & KIRK P.A. (May 7, 2012),
http://www.youhavealawyer.com/blog/2012/05/07/medtronic-infuse-lawyers/
(advertising for potential lawsuits related to “problems following off-label use of
the genetically engineered bone growth stimulator”).
81. United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No. 09-10330-GAO, 2010 WL
2900684 (D. Mass. July 21, 2010).
82. Complaint, Cabana v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No. BC 465313 (Cal. Super.
Ct. July 13, 2011).
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promotion of the bone void filler products in violation of the
FDCA: “By February 2009, two Stryker Biotech sales representatives
had pled guilty to illegally promoting the mixture of OP-1 and
83
Calstrux in violation of the FDCA.” She also referenced in her
complaint the indictments of Stryker Biotech and its president
“arising out of Stryker Biotech’s illegal off-label promotion of OP-1
84
and Calstrux to surgeons in various states, including California.”
The plaintiff generally alleged that “the Stryker Defendants,
through their sales representatives and paid Key Opinion Leaders,
directly and indirectly promoted, trained and encouraged Dr.
Mesiwala to engage in the off-label procedure of mixing Calstrux
85
with OP-1 Putty.”
The Cabana complaint asserted claims of negligence, strict
liability, breach of express and implied warranty, fraud, and
86
negligence per se against the Stryker defendants. Specifically, the
plaintiff alleged the Stryker defendants were negligent in (1)
“engaging in the illegal off-label promotion of these products”; (2)
“failing to disclose that the mixture of these two products had not
been approved by the FDA”; (3) “failing to disclose to physicians
that the mixture of these two products can result in serious side
effects”; (4) “failing to fully disclose the results of the testing and
other information in their possession regarding the possible
adverse reactions associated with the off-label mixture”; (5) “failing
to disclose the lack of clinical or other scientific evidence to
support any particular ratio in the mixture”; (6) “representing that
the mixture of these two products was safe”; (7) “promoting OP-1
Putty beyond the narrow and limited Humanitarian Device
Exception for which it was approved”; (8) “failing to adequately
warn the medical community, the general public, plaintiff’s
surgeon and plaintiff of the dangers, contra-indications, and side
effects from the use, mixed use, and off-label use of these two
products”; and (9) “failing to act as a reasonably prudent drug
87
88
manufacturer.” The Stryker defendants denied all allegations.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. para. 57.
See id. para. 58.
See id. para. 89.
See id. paras. 101–85.
See id. para. 105.
See Answer at 1, Cabana, No. BC 465313 (Nov. 28, 2011).
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Evidentiary Issues in Products Liability Actions Where There Is a
Parallel Government Prosecution

Civil products liability cases involving sales representative
allegations where there is a parallel government prosecution
present unique evidentiary challenges. Plaintiffs may want to
introduce the government enforcement action into evidence in the
civil case as evidence of wrongdoing or fraud by the defendant
company or its sales offices or representatives. This type of
evidence is often subject to a pre-trial motion in limine, where the
89
defendant will seek to exclude the evidence. While some courts
have admitted evidence regarding prior government enforcement
actions or settlements against the defendant company, other courts
90
have excluded the evidence as irrelevant and prejudicial. A trial
court’s determination of whether to admit evidence regarding a
prior government enforcement action is highly fact dependent and
generally will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of
91
discretion.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
provides a recent example of a court allowing into evidence at trial
92
documents related to a government enforcement action.
The
93
court found that a defendant’s corporate integrity agreement
regarding, inter alia, compliance with the Anti-Kickback statute was
89. See, e.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., No. 3:09-md-2100DRH, 2011 WL 6740391, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011) (seeking exclusion of a
corporate integrity agreement in a motion in limine); In re Seroquel Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2009 WL 223140, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30,
2009) (same); Block v. Abbott Labs., Inc., Nos. 99C7457, 01C1312, 01C1313,
01C1315, 01C1316, 2001 WL 1539159, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2001) (seeking
exclusion of a consent decree between medical device manufacturer and FDA).
90. See, e.g., Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4 (admitting evidence of a
corporate integrity agreement); Seroquel, 2009 WL 223140, at *7 (excluding
evidence of a corporate integrity agreement); Block, 2001 WL 1539159, at *2
(excluding evidence of a consent decree between medical device manufacturer
and FDA).
91. See U.S. v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding admission of
other crimes evidence “may be overturned only for an abuse of discretion”);
Kramas v. Sec. Gas & Oil Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding, in action
for alleged violations of securities law, it was not reversible error for trial court to
refuse to admit evidence of consent decree entered in prior securities
enforcement proceedings against defendant and other persons in light of fact that
“[t]he consent decree involved no finding of culpability and no judgment of
wrongdoing” and the probative value of the evidence was “committed to the trial
court’s sound discretion”).
92. See Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4.
93. See supra note 14.
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relevant evidence in a civil products liability litigation.
The
corporate integrity agreement also specifically referenced a
settlement agreement with the United States that was being filed
95
contemporaneously with the corporate integrity agreement. The
motions in limine related to one or more cases that were a part of
the In re Yasmin and Yas (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices and
96
PMF Products Liability Litigation. The complaints alleged claims for
strict products liability, breach of express and implied warranty,
negligence, negligence per se, fraudulent misrepresentation,
fraudulent concealment, fraud, and misrepresentation related to
the plaintiffs’ ingestion of the oral contraceptive Yasmin (also
97
known as YAZ, Ocella, and drospirenone and ethinyl estradiol).
The court provided very little reasoning, other than that the
98
agreements were relevant and a Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
character evidence analysis was not required, but even if such an
analysis were performed, the evidence was admissible to show
99
intent and lack of mistake. Although the briefing in this case is
sealed, presumably the defendant argued that the corporate
integrity agreement should not be admissible at trial because it is
evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act” used to prove Bayer’s
character and that, here, Bayer acted in accordance with that
100
character.
Despite the fact that the corporate integrity
agreement makes no mention of the product at issue in the case—
94. Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
AND BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC 13 (2008) [hereinafter BAYER CORPORATE
INTEGRITY AGREEMENT], available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements
/fully_executed_bayer_cia_112508.pdf.
95. BAYER CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT, supra note 94, at 1.
96. Sims v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms., No. 3:09-cv-10012-DRH-PMF, 2011
WL 6740391 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011); Bradish v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms., No.
3:09-cv-20021-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 6740391 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011), Laforet-Neer
v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms., No. 3:10-cv-10223, 2011 WL 6740391 (S.D. Ill. Dec.
22, 2011).
97. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, Laforet-Neer, No. 3:10-cv-10223-DRH-PMF (Feb.
23, 2010), ECF No. 2.
98. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides, “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character;” however, “[t]his
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident.”
99. See Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4.
100. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
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the drug Yaz—the court still found the agreement relevant and
101
admissible.
Conversely, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida found a corporate integrity agreement with the federal
government related to the pricing of an anti-cancer medication was
not relevant in civil products liability litigation involving the
102
company’s anti-psychotic medication.
Plaintiffs argued that they
would not introduce evidence of the anti-cancer litigation and
settlement except to rebut any “good corporate citizen” testimony
103
offered by the defendants at trial. The court found that “a party’s
agreement as to a particular standard of care for a completely
different medication, used to treat a completely different
condition—cancer—is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case; its
prejudice outweighs any potential probative value, wastes time, and
104
will confuse the jury.”
Other courts have evaluated whether consent decrees entered
into between the FDA and pharmaceutical or medical device
manufacturers are admissible. For example, in Block v. Abbott
105
Laboratories, Inc.,
the plaintiffs sought discovery regarding a
consent decree between Abbott and the FDA regarding failure to
106
comply with FDA regulations. The court evaluated whether such
discovery would be relevant, finding that “the Consent Decree is
107
The court reasoned that the
not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.”
consent decree did not identify the product at issue in the products
108
liability suit as one of the Abbott products of concern. The court
also found that the consent decree was focused on manufacturing
deficiencies whereas the plaintiffs’ complaint was based upon
109
design defects and a failure to warn.
The court
concluded,“Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how Abbott’s
101. See Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4; see generally BAYER CORPORATE
INTEGRITY AGREEMENT, supra note 94.
102. See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2009
WL 223140, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2009).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Nos. 99C7457, 01C1312, 01C1313, 01C1315, 01C1316, 2001 WL 1539159,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2001).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Rufer v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 99-2-27090-8 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Apr. 19, 2001), which reached the same conclusion and found evidence of the
consent decree not admissible at trial).
108. See id. at *3.
109. See id.
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manufacturing practices are relevant to their case.”
Another court evaluated whether a products liability claim
could be filed based entirely on a consent decree. In Polk v. KV
111
Pharmaceutical Co., the plaintiff filed a putative class action against
KV Pharmaceutical Company and Ther-Rx Corporation, in
112
connection with plaintiff’s use of metroprolol succinate ER.
Prior to the plaintiff’s suit, the FDA formally alleged the defendants
were not in compliance with current good manufacturing practices
and alleged the medication produced in their facilities was
113
adulterated. The FDA and the defendants entered into a consent
decree in which the defendants neither admitted nor denied the
allegations levied by the FDA, and the defendants also recalled
114
inventories of metroprolol succinate ER. The U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff relied heavily on the consent
decree, which was “not conclusive proof of wrongdoing” and could
not be used to “bootstrap Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants in the
absence of any independent factual allegation . . . that the
Medication was somehow defective because it is unfit for the
ordinary purposes for which it was marketed, thereby injuring the
115
Plaintiff.”
Various governmental agencies have made it clear that they
intend to hold executives, including sales executives, criminally
liable for violations of health care laws. Similarly, manufacturers
should be aware that aside from exposing themselves and their
sales representatives to personal criminal and civil liability for
government enforcement actions, any such enforcement actions
may also expose the company and its sales representatives to
additional civil products liability claims. Moreover, a company
should keep in mind that the outcome of any investigation,
whether it is no action, a consent decree, a corporate integrity
agreement, a fine, or other result, may have implications in its
portfolio of civil products liability litigation, even if entirely
unrelated to the medical device at issue in the civil products
liability lawsuit.
110.
111.
2011).
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id.
No. 4:09-CV-00588 SNLJ, 2011 WL 6257466, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3, *8.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF RIEGEL ON SALES REPRESENTATIVE LIABILITY
The Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. has
changed the landscape of medical device products liability
116
lawsuits.
This section will briefly discuss the Riegel decision and
then examine the impact that the decision has had on the type of
claims that plaintiffs are bringing to avoid preemption. As this
section will demonstrate, Riegel has caused plaintiffs to assert novel
theories of liability against medical device manufacturers that
commonly attack the alleged actions, inactions, and
representations of the manufacturers’ sales representatives. Finally,
this section will examine the small number of judicial decisions that
have discussed whether Riegel preemption applies even when sales
representative liability is asserted and possible areas where a
plaintiff may be able to plead a non-preempted claim against a sales
representative.
A.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. Overview

The express preemption clause contained in the Medical
Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the FDCA specifies that no state is
permitted to impose “any requirement” relating to the safety or
effectiveness of a medical device or any other matter regulated by
the MDA that is “different from, or in addition to, any requirement
117
applicable . . . to the device.”
Because of the extensive
requirements imposed upon medical devices through the
premarket approval (PMA) process and the express preemption
provision in the MDA, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Riegel that
any state law tort claim seeking to impose requirements “different
from, or in addition to” those imposed by the PMA process is
118
expressly preempted.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled
that the MDA’s express preemption provision “bars common-law
claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a medical device

116. 552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008).
117. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). Specifically, the MDA preemption provision
provides that no state or political subdivision of a state may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement “(1)
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this [Act]
to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
[Act].” Id. (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 45 (1976).
118. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321–22.
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119

given premarket approval by the [FDA].”
In concluding the
MDA’s preemption clause “‘remove[s] all means of judicial
recourse’ for consumers injured by FDA-approved devices,” the
Court explained that
the text of the statute . . . suggests that the solicitude for
those injured by FDA-approved devices . . . was overcome
in Congress’s estimation by solicitude for those who would
suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed
120
to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations.
In Riegel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s Class III
medical device was designed, labeled, and manufactured in a
manner that violated state common law and that these defects
121
caused severe injuries. In resolving whether the plaintiffs’ claims
were preempted, the Court established a two-step procedure. First,
courts must determine whether “the Federal Government has
established requirements applicable to” the particular medical
122
device. The Court found that medical devices approved through
the PMA process automatically satisfy the first prong of the Riegel
123
preemption analysis.
As a second step, courts must then determine whether the
state law claims at issue “are based upon . . . requirements with
respect to the device that are ‘different from, or in addition to’”
those imposed by the MDA and if they are, then the claims are
124
The Riegel Court found that the plaintiffs’ state law
preempted.
defective design, defective manufacturing, defective testing, and
failure to warn claims sounding in strict liability, negligence, and
breach of implied warranty “constitute[d] ‘requirements’ under
125
the MDA.” The Court reasoned that “State tort law that requires
a manufacturer’s [device] to be safer, but hence less effective, than
the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme” and
the judgment of a jury should not second-guess the judgment of
126
“the experts at the FDA.” For purposes of the MDA’s preemption

119. Id. at 315.
120. Id. at 326.
121. Id. at 320.
122. Id. at 321.
123. Id. at 323; see also DeLeon v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C-1-177, 2011 WL
2618957, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2011); Yost v. Stryker Corp., No. 2:09-cv-28-FtM29DNF, 2010 WL 1141586, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010).
124. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)).
125. Id. at 323–24.
126. Id. at 325.
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clause, state common law duties constitute “requirements,” and
“the duties underlying negligence, strict-liability, and implied127
warranty claims are . . . maintained with respect to devices.”
Therefore, Riegel held unequivocally that the MDA expressly
preempts state common-law causes of action that impose
“different” or “addition[al]” requirements than any requirement
128
imposed by the PMA of a device.
The Court recognized,
however, that the MDA “does not prevent a State from providing a
damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA
regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than
129
The Court recognized that the
add to, federal requirements.”
issue of whether the plaintiffs had pled a parallel claim was not
before them and declined to elaborate on what would constitute a
130
non-preempted parallel claim.
Since Riegel, plaintiffs’ primary
focus has been trying to plead claims that fit within this
131
“loophole.”
B.

Riegel’s Effect on Plaintiffs’ Products Liability Claims

As other commentators have noted, lower courts’ application
132
of Riegel preemption has been somewhat inconsistent.
Nonetheless, post-Riegel, the majority of courts addressing state tort
law claims involving a Class III medical device have found that the
133
plaintiffs’ claims are preempted.
In Riegel, the Supreme Court

127. Id. at 323–26 (internal quotations omitted).
128. See id. at 321–22.
129. Id. at 330.
130. See id.
131. See generally Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Note, Medical Devices and Preemption:
A Defense of Parallel Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 1196–97 (2011).
132. See Samuel Raymond, Note, Judicial Politics and Medical Device Preemption
After Riegel, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 745, 749–51 (2010).
133. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592
F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1152 (D. Minn. 2009) (“In the . . . months following Riegel,
courts across the country have applied Section 360k(a) broadly, preempting all
manner of claims . . . .”) (finding breach of express and implied warranty claims,
fraud claims, and claims for deceptive trade practices preempted); see also James
M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-Liability Litigation: Where We Are
and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 657, 678–79 (2009) (noting the
extensive preemption of premarket approval devices); Malika Kanodia, Comment,
The Fate of the Injured Patient in the Wake of Riegel v. Medtronic: Should Congress
Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 791, 794 (2009) (“[Riegel] virtually ensures that
medical device manufacturers enjoy legal immunity from injury claims involving
products that have secured premarket approval from the FDA.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

1110

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

suggested that the scope of preemption encompasses traditional
products liability claims such as those alleging negligence, strict
134
liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranty.
Lower courts
have been fairly consistent in finding that these types of claims are
preempted pursuant to Riegel. For example, courts have regularly
dismissed failure to warn claims involving a Class III medical
135
device’s labeling on preemption grounds.
Similarly, courts have
found breach of warranty and garden-variety negligence claims
136
asserted against manufacturers to be preempted.
Because a large number of traditional claims against medical
device manufacturers have been summarily dismissed, plaintiffs
have been forced to seek creative means for pleading a nonpreempted claim. One common way that plaintiffs have tried to
avoid preemption is by framing their claims as seeking to enforce
137
parallel state obligations to federal law.
However, several courts
134. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 327–29.
135. See, e.g., Leonard v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-03787-JEC, 2011 WL
3652311, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2011) (dismissing failure to warn claims on
express preemption grounds); Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d
1270, 1286 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Parker
v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (D. Colo. 2008) (same). However,
even the causes of action specifically addressed in Riegel have not been universally
found to be preempted. The District Court of Puerto Rico recently found that
plaintiffs’ claim that they received no warning regarding an EON rechargeable
impulse generator was not preempted, noting that the plaintiffs were not
“advocating for labeling or warning that is different from or in addition to that
which is already approved in the device PMA.”
Carrelo v. Advanced
Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (D.P.R. 2011); see also Hofts
v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 830, 832 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (finding
no preemption, despite Riegel’s overt criticism of § 808.1(d)(1)).
136. For examples of breach of warranty claims against manufacturers that
courts have found to be preempted, see Heisner v. Genzyme Corp., No. 08-C-593,
2009 WL 1210633, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2009) (breach of express warranty claim
preempted); Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 284–87 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (breach of express warranty, implied warranty of fitness, and implied
warranty of merchantability claims, as well as state law claim for deceptive trade
practices preempted); Parker, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1301–03 (breach of express
warranty, implied warranty of fitness, and implied warranty of merchantability
claims preempted). For examples of courts finding that a negligence claim is
preempted, see Walker v. Medtronic, Inc., 670 F.3d 569, 577–81 (4th Cir. 2012)
(finding claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty preempted);
Duggan v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 466, 473 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding
negligence claims preempted); Wheeler v. DePuy Spine, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d
1264, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (“Florida law does not authorize the only type of
‘negligence’ claims that might survive the MDA, i.e., a claim based on violation of
federal requirements.”).
137. See, e.g., Steiden v. Genzyme Biosurgery, No. 3:11 CV-441-S, 2012 WL
2923225, at *3–5 (W.D. Ky. July 18, 2012) (finding that plaintiff pled non-

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/3

24

Jacxsens et al.: Beyond the Basics: Expanding Theories of Liability and Defenses f

2013]

BEYOND THE BASICS

1111

have rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid preemption simply by
repeatedly referencing “parallel claims” in their complaints,
finding that the claims are nothing more than repackaged claims to
impose additional or different obligations on device manufacturers
138
and thus are preempted pursuant to Riegel.
The key factor for
many courts in deciding whether plaintiffs have adequately pled a
parallel claim that avoids preemption is whether they explicitly
139
plead that the defendant violated a specific FDA regulation.
Plaintiffs have also regularly attempted to avoid preemption by
alleging that a manufacturer withheld or misrepresented risk
information associated with its device during the premarket
140
approval process.
However, courts have largely rejected such
claims as barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckman v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, where the Court held that fraud-on-the141
FDA claims are impliedly preempted by federal law.
preempted claim of adulteration); Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145,
161–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to plead a parallel claim);
Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658–59 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (discussing
plaintiff’s attempt to plead a state law parallel claim).
138. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592
F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156–65 (D. Minn. 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that
claim was not preempted because parallel to federal law); Link v. Zimmer
Holdings, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178–80 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same); Heisner v.
Genzyme Corp., No. 08-C-593, 2008 WL 2940811, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2008)
(same); Mattingly v. Hubbard, No. 07CI12014, 2008 WL 3895381 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July
30, 2008) (same); see also Stevens v. Pacesetter, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-3812, 2008 WL
2637417, at *1–2 (D.S.C. Apr. 1, 2008) (ruling that wife’s loss of consortium claim
was not a parallel claim because it relied on the same alleged wrongful conduct as
the patient’s claims to impose additional or different requirements on the
manufacturer).
139. See, e.g., Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 440–42
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding claim alleging manufacturer violated good
manufacturing practice federal rule not preempted); Rhynes v. Stryker Corp., No.
10-5619 SC, 2011 WL 5117168, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011) (allowing plaintiffs
leave to amend to more specifically allege violations of particular FDA
requirements); Phillips v. Stryker Corp., No. 3:09-CV-488, 2010 WL 2270683, at *7
(E.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010) (ruling that claims alleging manufacturer’s conduct
violated 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20(b)(2) and 820.70(e) were parallel and not
preempted); Horowitz, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (requiring plaintiff to plead the
specific PMA requirement allegedly violated).
140. See, e.g., Leonard, 2011 WL 3652311, at *11 (alleging that medical device
manufacturer withheld information from the FDA); Clark v. Medtronic, Inc., 572
F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (D. Minn. 2008) (arguing that defendant violated
premarket approval authority); McCutcheon v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 2d 917, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same).
141. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001)
(holding that Congress has given the FDA exclusive power to enforce the FDCA
and MDA). For examples of cases finding claims to be preempted by Buckman, see
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Novel Allegations Against Sales Representatives Post-Riegel

As is the case in most products liability lawsuits, the majority of
post-Riegel medical device lawsuits have involved claims arising from
a manufacturer’s design and labeling for a device. However, as one
court has stated, it is “a narrow gap through which a plaintiff’s
state-law claim must fit if it is to escape express or implied
142
preemption.”
Accordingly, in addition to attempting to
repackage and attach different labels to their claims against
medical device manufacturers, plaintiffs have also started to attack
actions and representations made by a manufacturer’s sales
representative. An examination of these different types of theories
is useful to better understand how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Riegel has resulted in plaintiffs increasingly scrutinizing the actions
undertaken by medical device sales representatives.
1.

Duty to Warn, Supervise, or Train

Perhaps the most common type of claim against medical
device sales representatives asserts that the representative breached
his or her duty to protect the patient by failing to adequately warn,
supervise, or train the operating physician. Although these types of
claims existed prior to Riegel, they have become more prevalent in
143
the post-Riegel legal environment.
A large portion of failure to
warn claims involve a sales representative failing to verbally advise a
144
For
physician about the use or implantation of the product.
Leonard, 2011 WL 3652311, at *8; Clark, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (holding that
plaintiff’s efforts to avoid Riegel preemption by relying on the manufacturer’s
alleged withholding risk information from FDA are prohibited by Buckman
because “Congress has granted the FDA exclusive power to enforce MDA
premarket approvals”); McCutcheon, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 922. But see Heisner, 2008
WL 2940811, at *5 (suggesting that a claim resting on a manufacturer’s failure to
fully participate in the PMA process is a parallel claim that is not preempted).
142. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d
1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777
(D. Minn. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (alleging “breach of the duty to use reasonable care in the
instruction and education of physicians”); Rollins v. St. Jude Med., 583 F. Supp. 2d
790, 802 (W.D. La. 2008) (alleging that manufacturer failed to adequately train
doctor about medical device used during an angiogram); O’Connell v. Biomet,
Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1280 (Colo. App. 2010) (regarding plaintiff alleging that the
manufacturer and sales representative failed to provide adequate warnings and
instructions to surgeons about the dangers and installation of the elbow fixator).
144. Reuter v. Medtronic, Inc., No. L-2592-10, 2012 WL 3635955, at *1 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. June 18, 2012) (regarding plaintiff seeking to amend
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example, in Harrington v. Biomet, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the
sales representative was negligent for not advising the surgeon as to
what size and type of components to use in a hip replacement
surgery and for not suggesting that a different implant might be
145
more appropriate for a younger individual, such as the plaintiff.
In addition to alleging that a sales representative failed to verbally
warn a physician about a risk associated with a medical device,
plaintiffs have also based negligence claims on a representative’s
146
failure to provide written package inserts to a physician.
While failure to warn and failure to train claims normally focus
on what a sales representative failed to do, plaintiffs have also
attacked the actions that the sales representative actually
undertook. In Adkins v. Cytyc Corp., the plaintiff’s claim was based
on allegations that the defendant’s sales representative—who was
present during the plaintiff’s medical procedure—deviated from
FDA-approved materials and provided inaccurate information to
147
the treating physician that resulted in the plaintiff’s injuries.
In
another case challenging a sales representative’s actions, rather
than inactions, the plaintiff in William Beaumont Hospital v.
Medtronic, Inc., alleged that the manufacturer’s representative sent
a free sample of its pain pump refill kit to the wrong hospital
department and represented that the sample could be used in a
refill procedure, when in fact it could not, because the sample was
148
a catheter access kit used for a different purpose.
2.

Off-Label Use and Promotion

Plaintiffs have also commonly brought claims focusing on a
device’s off-label use in an attempt to avoid preemption, despite
the fact that the device at issue in Riegel—a balloon catheter—had
149
Off-label use of a medical device occurs
been used off label.
complaint to add negligence claim based on sales representative’s presence in
operating room and failure to advise physician of potential defect with the device).
145. No. CIV-07-25-R, 2008 WL 2329132, at *7 (W.D. Okla. June 3, 2008).
146. See Wehner v. Linvatech Corp., No. 06-CV-1709 JMR/FLN, 2008 WL
495525, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2008) (alleging that the manufacturer violated its
duty to warn because sales representatives did not provide package inserts to
physicians).
147. No. 4:07CV00053, 2008 WL 2680474, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. July 3, 2008).
148. No. 09-CV-11941, 2009 WL 2849546, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2009).
149. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008) (concerning a
catheter that was used in a diffusely diseased and heavily calcified artery, despite
warnings that such use was contraindicated and was inflated beyond its rated burst
pressure).
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when a device is used in a manner different from the use approved
150
Although FDA has the power to regulate off-label
by the FDA.
promotion of devices, it does not have any power “to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to
prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for
any condition or disease within a legitimate health care
151
practitioner-patient relationship.”
In light of Riegel, plaintiffs are asserting that a device
manufacturer’s off-label promotion of its products allows otherwise
preempted failure-to-warn or negligence claims to survive
152
The implication of a sales representative’s conduct
preemption.
in a plaintiff’s claim relating to off-label promotion is evident in the
153
recent case Hall v. Horn Medical, L.L.C.
In Hall, the plaintiff
brought negligence claims against a distributor of a spinal-fusion
device and a negligent-misrepresentation claim against an
independent contractor working as a sales representative for the
154
distributor. The implanting surgeon ignored explicit instructions
in the device’s package insert and testified that he performed the
procedure because the sales representative told him that the device
155
was appropriate for this particular “off-label use.” In other cases,
plaintiffs have alleged that a sales representative’s mere presence at
a procedure involving an off-label use of a device constitutes
unlawful off-label marketing and promotion and allows otherwise
156
preempted claims to survive.
3.

Unauthorized Practice of Medicine

Sales representatives who engage in extensive conduct in the
operating room or in pretreatment analysis of medical records or
radiology films often run the risk of running afoul of a state statute
150. See Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1283 (M.D.
Fla. 2009).
151. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006).
152. Coleman v. Medtronic Corp., No. SC112290, 2012 WL 2335532, at *1
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2012) (addressing claims of off-label promotion); O’Shea
v. Cordis Corp., No. 50 2006 CA 013019 AA, 2008 WL 3139428, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
May 19, 2008) (same); Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1057 (N.J.
2012) (same).
153. No. 11-1032, 2012 WL 1752546, at *1 (E.D. La. May 16, 2012).
154. Id. at *1, *3.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1283
(M.D. Fla. 2009); see also Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 778 (D. Minn.
2009) (rejecting argument that off-label use makes Riegel inapplicable).
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157

regulating the unauthorized practice of medicine.
Although
some states have made the unauthorized practice of medicine a
158
crime, plaintiffs may also bring civil claims against medical device
sales representatives based on these statutes. In Disbrow v. Smith &
Nephew Richards Inc., the plaintiffs sued the device manufacturer
and its sales representative for “practicing medicine without a
license” when a handle on a tool being used in plaintiff’s hip
159
replacement surgery broke. According to the plaintiffs, the sales
representative was present during the surgery and was responsible
160
for locating a new handle for the tool.
Likewise, in Wilkerson v.
Christian, a patient underwent a procedure to remove tumors from
161
her liver by burning them with an electrode. After the procedure
was unsuccessful and the patient died, the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death action against the manufacturer of the electrode
and its sales representative alleging that the sales representative
“personally performed the ablation procedure when she operated
medical equipment that was directly, by way of a continuous circuit,
162
inserted into [Plaintiff’s] body.” Although the case was dismissed
on statute of limitations grounds, the court noted: “Plaintiff alleged
facts, in good faith, that raise serious questions regarding the
propriety of sales representatives in the operating room. The
gravity of Plaintiff’s allegation that a sales representative
performed, or participated in, [Plaintiff’s] tumor ablation
163
procedure is not lost on this court.”
4.

Invasion of Privacy/Informed Consent and Assault/Battery

Another theory that plaintiffs traditionally have advanced and
possibly will assert more frequently against sales representatives
post-Riegel is that a sales representative’s undisclosed presence
157. For examples of state statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of
medicine by non-physicians, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 6 (West, Westlaw
through 2012 2d Annual Sess. General Court) and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.001
(West, Westlaw through end of 2011 Reg. Sess. and 1st Called Sess. of 82d
Legislature) (requiring a medical license to practice medicine).
158. For examples of state statutes making the unauthorized practice of
medicine a crime, see MINN. STAT. § 147.081 (2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 165.153(a) (Westlaw).
159. No. 14-95-00759-CV, 1996 WL 593780, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 17,
1996).
160. Id. at *2.
161. No. 1:06CV00871, 2008 WL 483445, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2008).
162. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
163. Id. at *13.
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during a surgery constituted an invasion of the patient’s privacy. A
claim for intentional invasion of privacy occurs when someone
“intentionally intrudes . . . upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs . . . if the intrusion would be highly
164
offensive to a reasonable person.”
Thus, plaintiffs have argued
that a sales representative’s presence during a medical procedure—
without the consent of the patient—constitutes an invasion of
165
privacy.
For instance, in McDaniel v. Synthes, Inc., a patient and
her husband sued a medical device manufacturer, sales consultant,
and the hospital for, inter alia, invasion of privacy as a result of the
sales consultant’s attendance during a surgical procedure where an
allegedly defective orthopedic implant was removed and taken by
166
the sales representative for analysis.
Similarly, in Wolicki-Gables v.
Arrow International, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the sales
representative violated his informed consent by attending a surgical
procedure and disposing of a catheter connector removed during
167
the procedure.
Under some states’ laws, similar allegations can also give rise to
a claim for battery if the sales representative directly or indirectly
touched the patient without his or her express consent. For
example, in Clifford v. Tacogue, the plaintiff brought a claim for
medical battery against the manufacturer of a vascular closure
168
device used during a cardiac catheterization.
In this case, the
plaintiff asserted that the manufacturer was vicariously liable for
the sales representative entering the operation room and providing
the doctor with a closure device, which the doctor then allegedly
169
implanted without the patient’s consent.

164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
165. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Synthes, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-245RM, 2007 WL
3232186, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2007). In a slightly different context, the
plaintiff in Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharmaceuticals alleged that a pharmaceutical sales
representative observed her follow-up breast cancer appointment without
informing her that the individual observing the appointment was a drug
representative. 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410 (Ct. App. 2001). After the trial court
dismissed the patient’s complaint, the California Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that breast cancer patients have an objectively reasonable expectation that
they will not be observed by anyone other than medical personnel. Id. at 418.
166. McDaniel, 2007 WL 3232186, at *1.
167. 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1291–92 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296
(11th Cir. 2011).
168. No. M2009-01703-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2712534, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
July 8, 2010).
169. Id. at *1–2.
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Preemption of Claims Involving Allegations of Sales Representative
Misconduct

Despite the variety of claims being brought against sales
representatives in the post-Riegel landscape, only a handful of courts
have explicitly analyzed whether claims seeking to impose liability
based on the action or inaction of a medical device sales
representative survive preemption. This part will analyze the
reasoning used by the courts that have applied the Riegel analysis in
the context of sales representative liability and also discuss some
cases outside the context of sales representative liability, but that
nonetheless could be useful to a party seeking to evoke the
preemption defense set forth in Riegel.
Although plaintiffs have increasingly pled claims based on the
conduct of sales representatives, their attempts to avoid Riegel
preemption in this manner have been met with mixed results. At
least one court has found that claims against sales representatives
are preempted in their entirety. In Wolicki-Gables, the plaintiff
attempted to avoid preemption of his traditional products liability
claims against the manufacturer of a pain pump by focusing on the
alleged actions of the manufacturer’s representative, who was
170
present during a surgical procedure.
In this case, the plaintiff
asserted that the sales representative was negligent because he: (1)
breached a duty to instruct and educate the implanting doctor
about the pump; (2) breached a duty to ensure the pump worked
properly before it was implanted; (3) breached a duty to verify
informed consent to his presence; and (4) breached a duty to verify
that plaintiff consented to disposal of a removed part of the
171
device.
Without much discussion of its preemption analysis, the
court ruled that all of the claims against the manufacturer for strict
liability, negligence, and vicarious liability, as well as the negligence
claims against the representative, were expressly preempted under
172
Riegel.
On the other hand, one of the most plaintiff-friendly decisions
analyzing preemption in the context of sales representative liability

170. 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1282–91.
171. Id. at 1291.
172. Id. at 1282–87, 1291. The court in Wolicki-Gables also provided alternative
grounds for dismissing the plaintiff’s claims based on the sales representative’s
conduct, most notably the lack of any duty to undertake the actions asserted by the
plaintiff. Id. at 1291.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

1118

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

173

is the decision in Adkins v. Cytyc Corp.
In Adkins, the plaintiff
alleged that the manufacturer was negligent based on its sales
representative’s directions for surgery and preoperative
174
procedures.
In reasoning that such a claim was not preempted,
the court noted that “[t]he FDA does not regulate interactions
between corporate representatives and physicians on-site at a
particular surgery,” and “[t]hese localized situations are traditional
175
Therefore, the court ruled that,
matters for the common law.”
because such a claim did not challenge the design, manufacture, or
176
labeling of the device, it was not preempted by Riegel.
As two
legal commentators have noted, pursuant to the reasoning in
Adkins, almost any claim based upon a representative’s actions at a
177
surgery would survive preemption.
Similar reasoning is found in the decision in William Beaumont
178
Hospital v. Medtronic, Inc. In this case, the court acknowledged—
as it must—that any claim based on the device’s FDA-approved
179
label was preempted by Riegel. However, the court found that the
plaintiffs’ claim alleging liability based on the actions of a sales
representative in sending samples to the wrong hospital
department did not call into question the adequacy of the label
180
and, thus, the claim survived preemption.
Several courts have found that claims alleging off-label
promotion—claims that almost necessarily implicate the actions of
a sales representative in charge of such promotion—are not
181
preempted under Riegel.
In one of these cases, the New Jersey
Supreme Court recently held that, to the extent the defendant
manufacturer and its employees marketed or promoted off-label
uses of a device outside of the FDCA safe harbor for certain
173. No. 4:07CV00053, 2008 WL 2680474 (W.D. Va. July 3, 2008).
174. Id. at *2.
175. Id. at *3.
176. Id.
177. See Edward W. Gerecke & David J. Walz, Sales Reps in the OR: The Hunt for
Non-Preempted Claims, FOR DEF., Oct. 2010, at 27.
178. No. 09-CV-11941, 2009 WL 2849546, at *7–8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2009).
179. Id. at *7.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., James v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:10–CV–2082, 2011 WL 292240, at
*3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) (plaintiff’s allegations against manufacturer relating to
off-label promotion not preempted); O’Shea v. Cordis, No. 50 2006 CA 013019
AA, 2008 WL 3139428 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2008) (“Claims asserting that the
Defendants were negligent in marketing and promoting off label uses are not
preempted.”); Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1057 (N.J. 2012)
(same).
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promotional activities, the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim survived
182
Similarly, the federal court in James v. Stryker Corp.
preemption.
reasoned that claims attacking a manufacturer’s off-label
promotion of a device are different from a failure to warn claim
183
and survive preemption.
However, it should also be noted that
some courts have found that claims involving unlawful off-label
promotion of a device may be impliedly preempted under the
Supreme Court’s Buckman decision because “enforcing the FDCA is
184
exclusively the province of the federal government.”
Although not explicitly discussing sales representatives, several
judicial decisions have found that claims alleging that a
manufacturer failed to adequately train a physician about its
185
product are expressly preempted.
Because sales representatives
are often the individuals who communicate directly with a
physician about how to use a device, their conduct will often play a
186
central role in such claims. An example of a court’s preemption
analysis in the failure to train context is evident in Rollins v. St. Jude
Medical, in which the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer failed
to train her surgeon on the proper use of the Angio-Seal device
187
implanted during an angiogram. The court ruled that the failure
to train claim pled by the plaintiff was preempted, but noted that a
claim that the defendant manufacturer failed to abide by the
training requirements imposed by the FDA would survive
188
preemption as a parallel claim.
Preemption decisions analyzing fraud and express warranty
claims also provide some insight into whether a claim challenging
representations made by a sales representative would be found
preempted. Although the majority of courts have found express
182. Cornett, 48 A.3d at 1057.
183. James, 2011 WL 292240, at *3.
184. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (D. Minn. 2009).
185. See, e.g., Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div., Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 931–33 (5th
Cir. 2006) (holding that that a plaintiff’s failure-to-train claims were preempted
because the manufacturer’s training requirements and informational materials
had been previously approved by the FDA as part of the premarket approval
process); Rollins v. St. Jude Med., 583 F. Supp. 2d 790, 801–02 (W.D. La. 2008)
(rejecting claim of failure to train physician); Mattingly v. Hubbard, No.
07CI12014, 2008 WL 3895381 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July 30, 2008) (holding that claim
made against manufacturer for failure to train physicians is preempted).
186. See generally Gerecke & Walz, supra note 177 (noting that often “the case
against a manufacturer’s representative really boils down to a claim for ‘failure to
train my physician’”).
187. 583 F. Supp. 2d at 801–02.
188. Id. at 802.
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warranty claims based on a device’s label or representations about
189
the safety and effectiveness of the device to be preempted, a few
courts have held that breach of express warranty claims are not
necessarily preempted if they involve statements not approved or
mandated by the FDA, as these claims are more akin to a
contractual bargain between parties and are outside the purview of
190
the FDA. For example, in Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, the court
held that the plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims were preempted,
“except to the extent plaintiffs allege defendants have made
voluntary statements to third parties beyond and different from the
191
However, at
information on the approved label or packaging.”
least one court has expressed doubt as to whether a mere statement
about a product by a sales representative to a doctor would
192
constitute an express warranty under state law.
A handful of courts have applied the same preemption
reasoning to fraud and misrepresentation claims, finding that these
claims based on unregulated statements to doctors may survive
193
preemption.
These courts have reasoned that this type of fraud
189. See, e.g., Cooley v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 09-30-ART, 2012 WL 1380265, at
*4 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 20, 2012) (finding that the MDA preempts express warranty
claims relating to the safety and efficacy of a device because a finding that the
device was not safe and effective would be contrary to the FDA’s approval of the
device); Riley, 625 F. Supp. at 787 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding that plaintiff’s breachof-warranty claim was preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) to the extent it was based
on the contents of the device’s label).
190. See Ali v. Allergan USA, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-115 (GBL/TRJ), 2012 WL
3692396, at *16 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2012) (holding that a claim for breach of
express warranty would not be preempted to the extent that it is based on
representations made by the manufacturer about the device that were not
approved by the FDA); O’Shea v. Cordis Corp., No. 50 2006 CA 013019 AA, 2008
WL 3139428 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2008) (“Nevertheless, it is clear that express
warranty claims focus on the contractual bargain between the parties and the
express representations made by one party to another. Therefore, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff's claim for breach of express warranty is not preempted.”);
Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1058 (N.J. 2012) (“[T]o the extent
the breach of express warranty claim is based on voluntary statements, i.e.,
statements not approved by the FDA or mandated by the FDA about the use or
effectiveness of the product for on-label or off-label uses, a breach of express
warranty claim may proceed because federal law requires any warranty statement
to be truthful and accurate.”).
191. Cornett, 48 A.3d at 1059.
192. See Cline v. Advanced Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-4064-AT,
2012 WL 3631320, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2012) (noting that any argument
that a sales representative’s statements to a doctor constituted an express warranty
stood on much weaker ground than an argument asserting that a written limited
warranty constituted an express warranty).
193. See, e.g., James v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:10-CV-2082, 2011 WL 292240, at *3
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and misrepresentation claim withstands the implied preemption
doctrine set forth in Buckman because the alleged fraud is being
194
committed on the physicians and patients, not the FDA.
While courts at times have struggled to consistently apply the
preemption doctrine expounded upon in Riegel, the number of
claims against medical device manufacturers found to be
preempted will likely result in a continued focus on the actions and
representations of sales representatives. In the limited number of
judicial decisions analyzing whether allegations against sales
representatives are preempted, two important themes emerge for
guiding medical device manufacturers related to their sales
representatives’ interactions with physicians. First, a court is more
likely to find that a claim against a sales representative survives
preemption if it is based on an affirmative action by the sales
representative, such as physically assisting or providing direction
during a surgery. Second, some courts may allow plaintiffs to plead
claims that survive preemption if they are based on statements or
promotional activities of a sales representative to a doctor
regarding an off-label use of a device or another matter outside of
the FDA-approved labeling.
It seems likely that plaintiffs will continue to pursue novel
theories against medical device sales representatives in an attempt
to navigate through the post-Riegel legal landscape. As the next
section will demonstrate, however, plaintiffs’ allegations against
medical device sales representatives can be motivated by other
purposes in addition to trying to avoid preemption.
IV. FRAUDULENT JOINDER AS A DEFENSE STRATEGY
Following Riegel, there has been an increase in cases where a
sales representative is named as an individual defendant in order to
defeat preemption. However, both prior and subsequent to the
Riegel decision, plaintiffs also have named sales representatives
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) (holding plaintiff’s allegations that manufacturer
committed fraud through off-label promotion not preempted); O’Shea, 2008 WL
3139428 (finding that fraud and misrepresentation claims regarding off-label
promotion survived preemption, but to the extent the plaintiff sought to rely on
general representations made concerning the devices contained in approved
labeling or brochures, such claims are preempted).
194. See James, 2011 WL 292240, at *3 n.2 (“Plaintiff’s allegations that
Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiff and her physicians are
also distinct from a claim that Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to
the FDA.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

1122

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

individually in order to prevent removal to federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. Federal court is generally seen as
more favorable to defendant manufacturers and, in contrast to the
manufacturer, sales representatives are often located in the same
state as the plaintiff. In order to establish jurisdiction in federal
court, out-of-state defendant manufacturers often argue that the instate sales representative was fraudulently joined. This section will
explore recent case examples where defendants have asserted
fraudulent joinder related to a defendant sales representative. This
section also includes a discussion of whether sales representatives
are considered “sellers” under state products liability law in the
context of alleged fraudulent joinder of the sales representative.
Where examples of medical device sales representative cases do not
exist, analogies are drawn to the available case law in those
jurisdictions, including cases involving pharmaceutical sales
representatives.
A.

Fraudulent Joinder Overview

A fraudulently joined party cannot defeat a court’s subject
195
matter jurisdiction. The burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff
196
fraudulently joined a resident defendant rests on the defendant.
This has been described as a “heavy burden” because the defendant
must show:
1. there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of
197
action against the resident defendant; or
2. the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring
198
the resident defendant into state court; or
3. there is no real connection between the claims against a
diverse defendant and those against a non-diverse
199
defendant.
195. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921).
196. Id.
197. Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20521, 2011 WL
3047794, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (discussing Eleventh Circuit fraudulent
joinder standard); see also Wilson, 257 U.S. at 97.
198. Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *2; see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 667, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing Third Circuit
fraudulent joinder standard).
199. The argument that a resident defendant has been fraudulently joined
because there is no real connection between the claims against the diverse
defendant and the non-diverse defendant is sometimes referred to as fraudulent
misjoinder or procedural misjoinder. The practical implications of a court finding
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In evaluating a defendant’s allegation that a non-diverse party has
been fraudulently joined, the court must find joinder proper and
remand the case back to state court if there is even a possibility that
a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action
200
against the non-diverse defendant.
The plaintiff is merely
required to show that he has asserted a “colorable claim” or an
arguably “reasonable basis” that state law could hold the non201
diverse defendant liable based on the alleged facts.
The
possibility that the resident defendant could be liable must be
202
reasonable and not theoretical.
Whether the claims against the
203
joined defendants are viable is a matter of state law.
Courts finding pharmaceutical and medical device sales
representatives fraudulently joined cite three primary reasons why
there is no possibility that plaintiff can state a claim against the
sales representative. First, courts examine whether the claim
against the non-diverse sales representative was properly pled
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and the cases
204
interpreting pleading standards for complaints. If the complaint
a non-diverse defendant misjoined as opposed to fraudulently joined are the
same—denial of the motion to remand and severance of the claims against the
non-diverse defendant. See, e.g., Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d
529, 533 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that if the claims asserted against the nondiverse defendants differ enough from the claims against the diverse defendants
such that they do not meet the joinder requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 20(a) or its state counterpart, the parties have been misjoined and
removal is proper); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1996) (adopting the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder); Rutherford v. Merck
& Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 850 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (finding fraudulent misjoinder is
an additional form of fraudulent joinder, “namely, ‘egregious’ misjoinder of
claims that is tantamount to fraudulent joinder”); Greene v. Wyeth, 344 F. Supp.
2d 674, 683–85 (D. Nev. 2004) (applying the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder);
In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 673 (describing procedural misjoinder as an
“attempt to defeat removal by joining together claims against two or more
defendants where the presence of one would defeat removal and where in reality
there is no sufficient factual nexus among the claims to satisfy the permissive
joinder standard”); Lee v. Mann, 51 Va. Cir. 465 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (same); 14B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723 (3d ed.
1998).
200. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998);
In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 672.
201. In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
202. See Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Great
Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir.
2002)).
203. See In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 672.
204. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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is short on factual detail related to the claims against the sales
representative, this may be a successful way to challenge the joinder
205
of the sales representative.
Second, some jurisdictions have
found uncontroverted affidavits or declarations from the sales
206
Finally,
representative sufficient to establish fraudulent joinder.
federal district courts analyze whether under state law the sales
representative owed a legal duty that could form the basis of
207
plaintiff’s claim.
Many states have adopted the learned
intermediary doctrine, and this can act as a bar to plaintiff’s failure
208
to warn claims.
1.

Insufficient Pleading Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

Recently, defendants have paired the doctrine of fraudulent
joinder with motions to dismiss, asserting that plaintiffs failed to
meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
209
8(a). Although this tactic has not been employed in any reported
medical device sales representative cases, it has been successfully
applied in cases involving medical device companies as well as
pharmaceutical sales representatives.
These cases provide
ammunition for similar arguments in cases where a medical device
sales representative may be fraudulently joined. For example, in
210
Beavers v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., the defendants successfully
argued fraudulent joinder by asserting that plaintiffs failed to meet
211
the pleading standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal.
In
Beavers, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Kentucky state court naming
medical device companies DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.; DePuy, Inc.;
Johnson & Johnson, Inc.; Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc.
205. See, e.g., Beavers v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20275, 2012
WL 1945603, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 30, 2012) (“[T]he lack of factual allegations
regarding Orthopaedic Partners, LLC, provides no more than labels and
conclusions insufficient to sustain viability of the legal claims.”).
206. See, e.g., Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1214 (N.D. Ala.
2006); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-20611, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19848, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2004).
207. See Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2004)
(holding that pursuant to the learned intermediary doctrine, the sales
representative does not owe a legal duty to warn the patient of the risks associated
with the device); Lizana v. Guidant Corp., No. Civ.A 1:03CV254GRO, 2004 WL
3316405, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2004).
208. See Catlett, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
209. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
210. Beavers, 2012 WL 1945603, at *1.
211. Id. at *2.
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(collectively referred to as the DePuy Defendants); and
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC. The DePuy Defendants removed the
case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and fraudulent joinder of
212
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC.
The DePuy Defendants moved to
stay all state court proceedings pending transfer of the action to
MDL 2197 (In re DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. ASR Hip Implant Products
Liability Litigation) and the plaintiffs subsequently filed their
213
motion to remand to state court.
The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case from the Western
District of Kentucky to the multidistrict litigation in the Northern
214
District of Ohio.
The issue before the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio was whether the case should be remanded back to
215
Kentucky state court.
Plaintiffs argued that defendant
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC was a Kentucky resident (like plaintiffs)
and destroyed diversity jurisdiction because plaintiffs asserted a
216
colorable claim against that defendant.
The defendants argued
that removal was appropriate because there was no viable claim
against defendant Orthopaedic Partners (in other words,
217
Orthopaedic Partners had been fraudulently joined).
Specifically, the defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to meet the
218
pleading standard articulated in Twombly and adopted by the
Sixth Circuit in Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of
219
Cleveland, Ohio.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
looked to the characterization of and factual allegations against
Defendant Orthopaedic Partners, LLC that plaintiffs’ asserted in
220
their complaint. The court noted that the complaint referred to
all defendants collectively and defendant Orthopaedic Partners,
LLC was only mentioned twice throughout the eighty-nine221
paragraph complaint.
The court found that “the allegations

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at *2.
See id.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007).
See Beavers, 2012 WL 1945603, at *4.
See id.
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against Orthopaedic Partners, LLC . . . fall well below the threshold
required to meet the plausibility standard required under
Twombly . . . . Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to distinguish between the
DePuy Defendants’ allegedly wrongful acts and those of
222
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC.”
The court went on to find,
“Assuming the facts as alleged against Orthopaedic Partners, LLC
to be true, without a modicum of additional facts, Plaintiff has
223
failed to establish a colorable basis for liability.”
The court
explained that “the lack of factual allegations regarding
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC, provides no more than labels and
224
conclusions insufficient to sustain viability of the legal claims.”
Thus, the court found “Orthopaedic Partners, LLC to be
225
fraudulently joined.”
Similarly, claims involving pharmaceutical or medical device
sales representatives may be subject to fraudulent joinder
arguments where the factual allegations asserted against the sales
226
representative are deficient.
In In re Diet Drugs Products Liability
227
Litigation, defendant Wyeth removed six lawsuits from Georgia
state court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
228
Each of the
Georgia on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
complaints named three Georgia sales representatives of Wyeth as
229
defendants.
Wyeth argued that the Georgia sales representative
defendants were fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction
and should be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity of
230
citizenship of the parties.
The plaintiffs asserted claims against
the sales representatives along with Wyeth for negligence and
negligent/reckless misrepresentation by marketing the drugs as
231
safe.
However, the complaints did not allege that any of the
222. Id. at *5.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. But see Stibor v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 04 C 1255, 2005 WL 1793589, at *4
(E.D. Wis. July 27, 2005) (“[P]laintiffs’ complaint plainly states a cause of
action . . . .”).
227. 294 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
228. See id. at 670.
229. Id. at 671. These cases also include allegations against two non-diverse
Wyeth government-relations employees as well as a non-diverse phentermine
manufacturer. Wyeth also argued that these parties were fraudulently joined.
Ultimately, the court found that these additional non-diverse defendants were also
fraudulently joined. Id. at 679.
230. Id. at 672.
231. Id. at 677.
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representatives actually had contact with the patients or physicians
232
Further, the
or that they made specific misrepresentations.
duties of the named sales representatives consisted solely of making
visits to physicians in Georgia to discuss an entirely different drug
233
than the drug plaintiffs allegedly had taken.
The court
concluded that “[t]he pleadings simply do not allege colorable
claims” against the sales representatives and that the
234
representatives were, therefore, fraudulently joined.
Beavers and In re Diet Drugs are examples of the successful use
of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder through the lens of a Rule 8
pleading challenge. While the standard for fraudulent joinder is
stringent, it may prove to be more successful if it is able to be
paired with a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself.
This strategy may be most useful for complaints that assert vague
claims against non-diverse defendants or complaints that lump all
the defendants together and merely assert collective claims without
specifying the involvement of the non-diverse defendant.
2.

Sales Representative’s Affidavit Provides Facts Showing Claims
Impossible Under Applicable State Law

In cases alleging claims against sales representatives
individually, a common strategy is to submit a declaration or
235
affidavit from the sales representative to provide facts showing
the claims are impossible under applicable state law and the sales
representative is, thus, fraudulently joined.
In fact, some
jurisdictions have found uncontroverted affidavits sufficient to
236
establish fraudulent joinder.
While defendants are generally

232. Id.
233. Id. Only one out of six of the plaintiffs ingested a drug that the sales
representatives marketed. See id.
234. Id.; see also In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding “plaintiffs do not allege that the defendant sales
representatives failed to warn the particular physicians who prescribed the drug
for them” and “plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations” were not sufficient to support
their claims for failure to warn).
235. The terms “declaration” and “affidavit” are used interchangeably in this
article.
236. See, e.g., Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV 08-0274
JCH/LAM, 2009 WL 382617, at *10 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009); Southern v. Pfizer, Inc.,
471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1214 (N.D. Ala. 2006); Faison v. Wyeth, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d
1273, 1278 (S.D. Ga. 2004); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-20611, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19848, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2004); In re Rezulin, 133 F.
Supp. 2d at 281.
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prohibited from going outside the pleadings when moving for
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), defendants
are permitted to include information outside the complaint when
237
responding to a motion to remand.
The proceeding for
resolving a claim of fraudulent joinder is more closely related to
the procedure used for ruling on a motion for summary judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b): “[T]he
determination of whether a resident defendant has been
fraudulently joined must be based upon the plaintiff’s pleadings at
the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits and deposition
238
transcripts submitted by the parties.”
239
In Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,
the plaintiff, an
Alabama resident, filed his complaint in Alabama state court
against out-of-state hip manufacturers, DePuy and its parent
company, Johnson & Johnson. The plaintiff also named a DePuy
medical device sales representative, who was an Alabama
240
The plaintiff alleged his hip implant caused him
resident.
damage because of DePuy’s conduct in connection with the
development, testing, manufacture, distribution, and sale of the
241
hip implant.
The defendants removed the case to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on the basis of
242
diversity jurisdiction. The defendants then filed a motion to stay
243
The
proceedings pending transfer to multidistrict litigation.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred this case to the
244
Northern District of Ohio for consolidated proceedings.
The
plaintiff filed a motion to remand arguing that the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio lacked subject matter
237. See, e.g., Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2005); see also
Baeza v. Tibbetts, No. 06-0407 MV/WPL, 2006 WL 2863486, at *3 (D.N.M. July 7,
2006) (“Although the court’s inquiry bears some resemblance to that of a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the scope of the inquiry is different, and the
court may look beyond the pleadings to determine whether the joinder is
fraudulent.”).
238. Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322–23; see also Dacosta v. Novartis AG, No. CV 01-800BR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21313, at *34 (D. Or. Mar. 1, 2002) (finding the sales
representative was a “sham defendant” who had been fraudulently joined after
reviewing the sales representative’s affidavit and facts developed during
jurisdictional discovery).
239. No. 1:11 dp 20521, 2011 WL 3047794, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011).
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
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jurisdiction because the defendants failed to prove fraudulent
245
The defendants opposed the
joinder of the sales representative.
motion to remand and submitted the resident sales representative’s
246
declaration in support.
The court held that the sales representative was fraudulently
joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction and denied the plaintiff’s
247
motion to remand.
As to plaintiff’s claims for negligent or
defective design, the court found that a claim against the sales
representative was not possible because the sales representative
submitted a declaration stating that he was without knowledge of
and has never been personally involved with the design of the
248
device. Specifically, the court found:
Plaintiff has not shown that the resident defendant had a
duty to warn the Plaintiff, nor has he produced evidence
to overcome the resident defendant’s testimony that he
has no knowledge of or involvement in the design of the
product. As a result, there is no possibility that Plaintiff
could establish a cause of action for negligence against
249
the resident defendant in an Alabama state court.
Similarly, the court found there was no possibility that plaintiff
could establish causes of action for products liability under the
250
Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, breach of
express and implied warranties, or misrepresentation and
251
fraudulent concealment against the sales representative.
The strategy of providing an affidavit or declaration from the
sales representative in order to prove the sales representative has
been fraudulently joined essentially shifts the burden onto the
plaintiff to provide factual evidence in support of the claims. As
the Patterson court found, it is the plaintiff’s burden to produce
252
evidence “to overcome the resident defendant’s testimony.”
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at *2.
248. Id. at *3–4.
249. Id. at *4.
250. ALA. CODE § 6-5-500 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess. and 1st
Special Sess.); see also Atkins v. Am. Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976)
(articulating the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine); Casrell v.
Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976).
251. Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *6–9.
252. Id. at *4. Patterson is one of many related actions contained in the
multidistrict litigation entitled In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., 1:10 md 2197, MDL 2197. See Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *1 n.1.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

43

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

1130

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

Indeed, ignoring a defendant’s affidavit has been found to be legal
253
error and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.
In addition to affidavits provided by the sales representative,
an affidavit or testimony from the treating physician may be useful
to prove there is no colorable claim against the sales representative.
For example, in a case alleging failure to warn, the physician’s
affidavit might state that even if the warning had been given to the
physician by the sales representative just as the plaintiff claims it
should have been, the warning would not have been material to the
physician, and the physician would not have changed the manner
in which the physician provided advice, care, and treatment to the
254
patient. A physician’s affidavit could also state that the physician
independently decided to use the device and did not rely on any
255
information provided by the sales representative. In this context,
the physician’s affidavit is submitted on behalf of the sales
representative in order to break the chain of proximate cause and
show that under applicable state law, there is no possibility that the
plaintiff has a cognizable claim against the non-diverse sales
representative.
3.

Sales Representative Has No Legal Duty to Warn Pursuant to the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine

Another commonly cited argument to support fraudulent
joinder of a sales representative is the learned intermediary
doctrine. The learned intermediary doctrine holds that any duty to
warn exists only between the manufacturer of the device and the

Indeed, the same result—finding a non-diverse sales representative defendant has
been fraudulently joined based, in part, on the uncontroverted affidavit of the
sales representative—has been reached in several other cases in that litigation. See,
e.g., Harper v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20522, 2011 WL 3049082
(N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (applying Alabama law and finding non-diverse sales
representative defendant fraudulently joined); Taylor v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,
No. 1:22 dp 20523, 2011 WL 3055295 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (same); Slay v.
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20524, 2011 WL 3052531 (N.D. Ohio July
25, 2011) (same); Milner v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 3:11 dp 20529, 2011
WL 3102320 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (same).
253. See Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In the case at
bar, the Defendants submitted sworn affidavits that were undisputed and, in such a
case, a court cannot resolve the question of fraudulent joinder by refusing to
consider the defendants’ submissions.”).
254. See, e.g., Bloodsworth v. Smith & Nephew, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1252
(M.D. Ala. 2006).
255. See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004).
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256

plaintiff’s prescribing physician or surgeon. Under this doctrine,
257
no duty exists between the plaintiff and the sales representative.
258
Lizana v. Guidant Corp. is an example of a court applying the
learned intermediary doctrine to find a medical device sales
representative owed no legal duty to plaintiff. In Lizana, the
plaintiffs moved the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi to remand their case to the Circuit Court of Harrison
259
The plaintiffs alleged that plaintiff Howard
County, Mississippi.
Lizana collapsed at work due to a malfunctioning pacemaker
260
manufactured by Guidant Corporation.
Plaintiffs sued both
Guidant Corporation as well as the Guidant representative who
261
performed routine checks on Mr. Lizana’s pacemaker.
The
plaintiffs specifically asserted that the medical device representative
(1) did not inform them that the pacemaker was subject to a recall,
(2) participated in the initial implant surgery, and (3) assured
262
plaintiffs that the pacemaker was functioning “perfectly.”
The
defendants argued that removal was proper because the sales
representative’s citizenship should be disregarded because he was
263
fraudulently joined.
The court concluded that the sales
representative could not be liable for any alleged failure to warn
nor was there any basis for the strict liability claims asserted against
264
him. The court reasoned, in part, that under Mississippi law, the
learned intermediary doctrine applies to all medical devices, and
sales representatives are under no obligation to warn patients about
265
the device.
Thus, the medical device sales representative in the
266
case could not be liable for any alleged failure to warn.
256. See, e.g., Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *4; Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 1374, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (arguing that pursuant to the learned
intermediary doctrine, the sales representative does not owe a legal duty to warn
the patient of the risks associated with the device). But see, e.g., Salazar v. Merck &
Co., No. 05-445, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 27776 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2005).
257. See Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *4.
258. No. Civ.A 1:03CV254GRO, 2004 WL 3316405, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21,
2004).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *2.
264. Id.
265. See id.
266. See id.; see also Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20521,
2011 WL 3047794, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (applying the learned
intermediary doctrine in the fraudulent joinder context and finding that, under
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Medical Device Sales Representatives as “Sellers” Under State Products
Liability Law

The question of whether a sales representative qualifies as a
“seller” under state products liability law has recently arisen in
medical device cases in the context of fraudulent joinder. If the
sales representative is considered a seller under the state products
liability statute, the sales representative could be held strictly liable
for device defects, such that a colorable claim against the sales
representative exists and the sales representative would not be
fraudulently joined. Because the determination of whether a sales
representative qualifies as a “seller” under state products liability
law necessarily turns on the statutory interpretation of state law,
there has been a wide range of outcomes, with some states finding
sales representatives are unequivocally not sellers and other states
finding sales representatives could possibly be sellers such that
267
joinder was not fraudulent.

Alabama law, the sales representative did not owe a duty to the patient and could
not possibly be liable for negligent failure to warn). But see Gibbs v. I-Flow, Inc.,
No. 1:08-cv-708-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 482285, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2009)
(“[A]pplication of the [learned intermediary] doctrine is fact-sensitive, and there
are too many uncertainties to be able to reasonably conclude that [defendant] will
prevail on such a defense.”).
267. See, e.g., Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *3 (citing Bloodsworth v. Smith &
Nephew, No. Civ.A. 2:05CV622-D, 2005 WL 3470337, at *21 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 19,
2005)) (applying Alabama law and finding sales representatives are not sellers);
Rundle v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00634-PMP-GWF, 2011 WL
3022569 (D. Nev. July 6, 2011) (applying Nevada law and finding it possible that a
sales representative could be strictly liable); Askew v. DC Medical, LLC, No. 1:11cv-1245-WSD, 2011 WL 1811433 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2011) (applying Georgia law
and finding sales representatives are not sellers); Lizana, 2004 WL 3316405 (same
applying Mississippi law); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Water Serv. Inc., 758
S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that a sales representative is not subject to strict
products liability under Tennessee law); see also McCarty v. Johnson & Johnson,
No. 1:10-CV-00350 OWW-DLB, 2010 WL 2629913 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2010)
(applying California law and finding sales representatives may be sellers); Gibbs,
2009 WL 482285 (same applying Indiana law); Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics,
Inc., No. CIV 08-0274 JCH/LAM, 2009 WL 382617 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009) (same
applying New Mexico law); Rape v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 9:04-CV-225, 2005 WL
1189826 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2005) (same applying Texas law); Bittler v. White &
Co., Inc., 560 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ill. App. 1990) (applying Illinois law and limiting
sales representative strict liability to cases where there is a “‘participatory
connection’ with the allegedly defective product”); Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 152
A.D.2d 69, 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (applying New York law and limiting sales
agent strict products liability to cases where the sales agent is a “mandatory link in
[the] distributive chain”).
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States Finding Sales Representatives Are Not “Sellers”

Courts applying Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Tennessee
law have found that under the respective state products liability
268
statutes, sales representatives do not qualify as “sellers.” Thus, if a
plaintiff asserts a strict liability claim against a salesperson on the
grounds that the salesperson is a “seller” in the chain of
distribution of the product in one of these states, no colorable
claim against the sales representative exists, such that a fraudulent
joinder argument would be successful.
In a case involving a medical device sales representative, the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, applying
Alabama law, found that the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s
Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) does not include a sales representative
269
within the definition of “seller” or “manufacturer.”
The court
cited the reasoning from the U.S. District Courts for the Southern
District of New York and the District of Minnesota in In re Rezulin
270
Products Liability Litigation
and In re Baycol Products Liability
271
272
Litigation, respectively, applying Alabama law, as persuasive. In
Rezulin, the court found that “holding a sales representative liable
under the AEMLD would contravene the doctrine’s scope and
purpose,” and the “sales representative was merely an agent of the
manufacturer/seller, and, as a ‘corporate employee,’ he was not
273
‘the one best able to prevent sales of defective drugs.’” Similarly,
the court in Baycol reached the same conclusion, finding “the
purpose of the AEMLD did not support a claim against a sales
agent who ‘had no authority to compel or prevent the distribution
268. See, e.g., Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *3 (holding that a sales
representative is not subject to strict products liability under Alabama law) (citing
Bloodsworth, 2005 WL 3470337, at *21); Askew, 2011 WL 1811433 (same applying
Georgia law); Lizana, 2004 WL 3316405 (same applying Mississippi law); Memphis
Bank & Trust, 758 S.W.2d 525 (same applying Tennessee law).
269. See Bloodsworth, 2005 WL 3470337, at *5 (“A defendant is liable under the
AEMLD if the plaintiff shows the following: ‘(1) [that] he suffered injury or
damages to himself . . . by one who sold a product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if (a)
the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is
expected to, and did, reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it was sold.’” (quoting Atkins v. Am. Motors Corp., 335 So.
2d 134, 141 (Ala. 1976))).
270. 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 287–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
271. M.D.L. No. 1431 (MJD), at *4–7 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2004) (order
denying motion to remand).
272. See Bloodsworth, 2005 WL 3470337, at *6.
273. See id. (quoting In re Rezulin Prods., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88).
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274

of particular products.’”
The U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama also cited the Supreme Court of Alabama,
finding that the court had “rejected the theory that a retailer who
lacks knowledge of a product’s dangerous defect can be liable
under the AEMLD simply for ‘the mere selling of a defective
275
product.’”
Synthesizing these cases, the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama found there was no reasonable
possibility that an Alabama court would find the medical device
276
sales representative liable under the AEMLD.
In some states, a straightforward interpretation of the state
products liability statutes provides clear guidance on whether a
277
salesperson can be held strictly liable under state law.
Courts
applying Mississippi law have held that medical device sales
representatives are not considered sellers and therefore are not
278
subject to strict liability for product defects.
Similarly, courts
applying Georgia law have found that medical device sales
representatives do not meet the definition of “sellers” under
Georgia law and cannot be found strictly liable for product
279
defects.
Both Mississippi and Georgia have explicit statutory
provisions regarding who is and who is not considered a seller
280
under state law.
For example, Mississippi law provides that a
seller other than the manufacturer will not be liable unless certain
requirements are met:
[T]he seller of a product other than the manufacturer
shall not be liable unless the seller exercised substantial
control over that aspect of the design, testing,
manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that
274. See id. at *6 (quoting In re Baycol Prods., M.D.L. No. 1431 (MJD), at *4).
275. See id. at *7 (quoting Atkins v. Am. Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 139
(Ala. 1976)).
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
278. See, e.g., Lizana v. Guidant Corp., No. Civ.A 1:03CV254GRO, 2004 WL
3316405, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2004) (applying Mississippi law).
279. See, e.g., Askew v. DC Medical, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-1245-WSD, 2011 WL
1811433 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2011) (holding that Depuy’s sole distributor of the
ASR hip device in Georgia was fraudulently joined because Georgia’s strict
products liability statute imposes liability only on the manufacturer of a product
and a seller or distributor is not strictly liable); see also Davenport v. Cummins Ala.,
Inc., 644 S.E.2d 503, 507–08 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing several Georgia decisions
and discussing the definition of a “seller” under Georgia law).
280. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(a) (Westlaw); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-163(h) (Westlaw).
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caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought;
or the seller altered or modified the product, and the
alteration or modification was a substantial factor in
causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought;
or the seller had actual or constructive knowledge of the
defective condition of the product at the time he supplied
the product. It is the intent of this section to immunize
innocent sellers who are not actively negligent, but
281
instead are mere conduits of a product.
The legal definition of a “seller” under Georgia law encompasses
sales representatives:
[A] person who, in the course of a business conducted for
the purpose leases or sells and distributes; installs;
prepares; blends; packages; labels; markets; or assembles
pursuant to a manufacturer’s plan, intention, design,
specifications, or formulation; or repairs; maintains; or
otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of
282
commerce.
However, Georgia’s Products Liability Act also explicitly provides
that “[f]or purposes of a product liability action based in whole or
in part on the doctrine of strict liability in tort, a product seller is
not a manufacturer as provided in Code Section 51-1-11 and is not
283
liable as such.”
Although Tennessee courts have not specifically addressed
whether a medical device sales representative would be defined as a
“seller” under the Tennessee Products Liability Act (TPLA), the
Tennessee Supreme Court evaluated whether a general product
sales representative could be subject to strict products liability in
284
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Water Services, Inc.
By analogy, this
case could be persuasive in Tennessee courts evaluating whether a
medical device sales representative qualifies as a seller under TPLA
and is, thus, instructive. In Memphis Bank, the owner of a large
commercial bank building brought a products liability action
against a corporation operating a commercial and industrial water
treatment business as well as the corporation’s sales
285
representative.
Plaintiff alleged breach of warranty, negligence,
and strict liability in tort for damage to the building’s windows and
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63(h) (Westlaw).
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(a) (Westlaw).
Id. § 51-1-11.1(b); see also id. § 51-1-11.
758 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1988).
Id. at 525.
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aluminum siding, which had become discolored by water
286
containing chemicals from the building’s air conditioning system.
287
After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed all of the claims. The
Tennessee Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the judgment of
the trial court and rendered judgment for the plaintiff against both
the corporation and the individual sales representative on the
theory of strict liability, assessing the sales representative with a
288
The Tennessee Supreme Court,
personal judgment of $78,808.
however, found that the sales representative was not a “seller” or
289
“manufacturer” of a product as defined by TPLA.
The court
pointed to evidence in the record that the sales representative was
paid a commission on all sales, was not a stockholder, a director, or
an officer of the corporation, and the products he sold did not
290
belong to him.
Thus, defendants arguing a sales representative
has been fraudulently joined in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, or
Tennessee, will likely be successful in asserting that the plaintiff
cannot state a claim for strict products liability as to the
salesperson.
2.

States Finding Sales Representatives May Be “Sellers”

While a few states have clear guidance on whether a
salesperson may be subject to strict products liability claims, the
vast majority of states have not definitively answered this
291
question.
Illinois and New York have answered the question in
the affirmative, but have placed specific limitations on claims
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 525–26.
289. Id. at 526; see also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-28-102(4), (7) (West, Westlaw
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.) (defining “manufacturer” as “the designer, fabricator,
producer, compounder, processor or assembler of any product or its component
parts” and “seller” as “a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and . . . any individual
or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for
resale, or for use or consumption”).
290. Memphis Bank & Trust, 758 S.W.2d at 526.
291. See, e.g., Rundle v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00634-PMPGWF, 2011 WL 3022569, at *7–13 (D. Nev. July 6, 2011) (applying Nevada law);
McCarty v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:10-CV-00350 OWW-DLB, 2010 WL 2629913,
at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (applying California law); Gibbs v. I-Flow, Inc.,
No. 1:08-cv-708-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 482285, at *3–4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2009)
(applying Indiana law); Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV 08-0274
JCH/LAM, 2009 WL 382617, at *5–8 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009) (applying New Mexico
law); Rape v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 9:04-CV-225, 2005 WL 1189826, at *2–3 (E.D.
Tex. May 19, 2005) (applying Texas law).
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292

against sales representatives.
In these jurisdictions, defendants
will likely be less successful arguing that the sales representative has
been fraudulently joined where the plaintiff claims strict liability
against the sales representative as a seller of the product because
these states have found that there is a “possibility” that a claim
could be sustained under applicable state law.
The majority of courts that have evaluated the issue under the
applicable state law, including Nevada, California, Indiana, New
Mexico, and Texas law, have found that while the issue has not
been definitively decided by the state’s highest court, in a
fraudulent joinder analysis it is possible that plaintiff could state a
claim for strict products liability against a pharmaceutical or
293
medical device sales representative.
For example, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada found that a medical
device sales representative may be strictly liable for design defects:
Because it is possible that the Nevada Supreme Court will
hold that a manufacturer’s exclusive sales representative is
strictly liable for design defects based on the type of
conduct alleged in this case, Precision Instruments has
not been fraudulently joined so long as there is a causal
nexus between its alleged conduct and Plaintiffs’
294
injuries.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California,
applying California law, found that it is possible a plaintiff could
recover against a medical device sales representative under the
295
stream of commerce theory.
The court, in McCarty v. Johnson &
296
Johnson,
found that the medical device sales representative
“worked for a separate sales company and attended Plaintiff’s
surgery to assure presence of the product” and the fact that neither
the sales representative nor his employer held title to the product
292. See, e.g., Bitter v. White & Co., 560 N.E.2d 979, 981–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(applying Illinois law and limiting sales representative strict liability to cases where
there is a “‘participatory connection’ with the . . . defective product”); Brumbaugh
v. CEJJ, Inc., 547 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700–02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (applying New York
law and limiting sales agent strict products liability to cases where the sales agent is
a “mandatory link in [the] distribution chain”).
293. See, e.g., Rundle, 2011 WL 3022569 (applying Nevada law); McCarty, 2010
WL 2629913 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (applying California law); Gibbs, 2009 WL
482285 (applying Indiana law); Spataro, 2009 WL 382617 (applying New Mexico
law); Rape, 2005 WL 1189826 (applying Texas law).
294. Rundle, 2011 WL 3022569, at *13.
295. See McCarty, 2010 WL 2629913, at *5.
296. Id.
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was “of no moment.” Similarly, other federal district courts in
California have granted motions to remand products liability
actions brought against resident independent sales representatives
of medical device manufacturers or suppliers on the grounds that
the sales representatives may potentially be liable under California
strict products liability law for defectively designed products whose
297
sales they facilitate.
Federal district courts interpreting state products liability laws
in Indiana, New Mexico, and Texas have found that even though
the highest court of the particular state has not determined that a
strict products liability claim against a medical device sales
representative is cognizable, an argument can be made that there is
a possibility the products liability statute applies. The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana stated: “Even in the
absence of any Indiana cases on point, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs can manage to make a reasonable argument in support of
their product liability claim by applying Indiana’s rules for statutory
298
construction.” Likewise, the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Mexico explained that “[w]hile it is not entirely clear whether
[plaintiff] could establish a strict liability cause of action against
[the sales representative] in state court, this Court cannot conclude
299
that there is no possibility of this.”
And the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas found “[the defendant] has not
shown that it is clear under Texas law that a sales representative of
a manufacturer, who might be some type of independent
contractor or retailer, and not an employee, can never be
300
considered a seller as defined in § 82.001.”
Although neither Illinois nor New York courts have specifically

297. See, e.g., Hinds v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:09cv0442 AWI DLB, 2009 WL
1517893 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2009); Becraft v. Ethicon, Inc., Nos. C00-1474CRB, C001493CRB, C00-1495CRB, C00-1496CRB, 2000 WL 1721056 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2,
2000).
298. Gibbs, 2009 WL 482285, at *3; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-77(a)(1)
(West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); McDaniel v. Synthes, Inc., No. 2:07CV-245RM, 2007 WL 3232186 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2007).
299. Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV 08-0274 JCH/LAM, 2009
WL 382617, at *8 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009); see also Baeza v. Tibbetts, No. 06-0407
MV/WPL, 2006 WL 2863486, at *4–5 (D.N.M. July 7, 2006) (reaching the same
conclusion).
300. Rape v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 9:04-CV-225, 2005 WL 1189826, at *3 (E.D.
Tex. May 19, 2005); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001, 82.003
(West, Westlaw through the end of 2011 Reg. Sess. and 1st Called Sess. of 82d
Leg.).
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analyzed whether a medical device sales representative could be
held liable for strict products liability, decisions in other products
liability contexts in these states demonstrate that the courts will
likely broadly interpret application of the respective products
liability laws to include medical device sales representatives. This
loose interpretation could include all individuals with a
“participatory connection” or a “mandatory link” to the injurycausing product. The Illinois Appellate Court, in Bittler v. White &
301
Co., Inc.,
analyzed the issue of whether an exclusive sales
representative company could be strictly liable under Illinois law
for personal injuries the plaintiff claimed to have sustained during
the course of his employment when he was struck on the head by
302
the tailgate of a truck-mounted vacuum loader and cleaner. The
court found that the determining factor was “whether the party in
question has any ‘participatory connection, for personal profit or
other benefit, with the injury-causing product and with the
enterprise that created consumer demand for and reliance upon
303
the product.’” Ultimately the court found that the sales company
had a participatory connection with the allegedly defective product
304
such that it could be strictly liable.
The Supreme Court of New York’s Appellate Division also
found that an exclusive sales agent may be subject to strict products
liability where the agent is a “mandatory link” in the distribution
305
306
chain.
In Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., the plaintiff’s decedent was
killed when a dumpster swung loose from a trash compactor and
307
pinned him against his truck. Plaintiff sued the trash compactor
manufacturer’s exclusive marketing agent claiming that the safety
308
latch on the compactor was defective.
The court analyzed
whether the exclusive marketing agent of the trash compactor
309
could be held strictly liable under New York products liability law.
The court found that “[l]iability is not to be imposed, however,
upon a party whose role in placing the defective product in the

301. 560 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
302. Id. at 980–81.
303. Id. at 981 (quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711,
725 (Ct. App. 1972)).
304. See id. at 982.
305. See Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 152 A.D.2d 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
306. Id. at 70.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See id.
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stream of commerce is so peripheral to the manufacture and
marketing of the product that it would not further these policy
310
considerations.”
The policy considerations indentified included
whether injured consumers would be afforded a greater
opportunity to bring an action against the responsible party,
whether the entity is in a position to exert pressure on the
manufacturer to improve safety of the product, and whether
liability would ensure that the burden of injury from the product
would be treated as a cost of production by placing liability on
311
marketers.
The court also noted that whether these potential
litigants in the distributive chain have an opportunity to seek
contribution or indemnification from the manufacturer is a
312
factor.
Based on these factors, the court held that the exclusive
sales agent could be subject to strict products liability under New
313
York law.
The court reasoned that “[i]ts activities involve it so
substantially, if not pervasively, in introducing these compactors
into the stream of commerce that it is fair to say that it is a
mandatory link in this distributive chain; hence, it may properly be
314
held liable in strict products liability.”
V. RECENTLY ASSERTED DEFENSES AND ULTIMATE CASE OUTCOMES
IN CASES INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF SALES
REPRESENTATIVE MISCONDUCT
Products liability cases involving medical device sales
representative conduct ultimately turn on the role of the
representative in patient treatment or the use of the medical device
during the surgery. The American Medical Association’s Code of
Medical Ethics provides that “[m]anufacturers of medical devices
may facilitate their use through industry representatives who can
play an important role in patient safety and quality of care by
providing information about the proper use of the device or
315
equipment as well as technical assistance to physicians.” To date,
products liability actions involving allegations that a medical device

310. Id. at 71.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 71–72.
314. Id. at 72.
315. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 8.047 (2007), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code
-medical-ethics/opinion8047.page.
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sales representative acted inappropriately attempt to impose a duty
on the sales representative, the medical device manufacturer, or
both based simply on the representative’s presence in the
operating or treatment room. The question then becomes what
the appropriate role of the medical device sales manufacturer in
the operating or treatment room is. While medical device sales
representatives can be an asset to physicians and surgical teams,
there is also potential liability for both the individual representative
as well as the device manufacturer.
This section explores the practical implications of an increase
in claims involving medical device sales representatives, including
the ultimate outcome of suits involving medical device sales
representatives. Each of the most commonly asserted defense
theories in cases asserting a medical device sales representative
owed a heightened duty of care to plaintiff are examined,
including the learned intermediary doctrine, absence of duty,
captain of the ship doctrine, and lack of causation. The available
case law makes clear that the potential liability of the medical
device sales representative is largely fact-sensitive and still under
development.
A.

Learned Intermediary Doctrine

As commentators and courts have noted, the “learned
intermediary” doctrine is a defense that applies in the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in cases against drug and
316
medical device manufacturers.
Courts applying the learned
intermediary doctrine to medical device cases have reasoned that
when a device is available only upon prescription of a duly licensed
physician, the warning required is not to the general public or to
317
the patient, but rather to the prescribing doctor.
Therefore,
316. Ellis v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 311 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that
the learned intermediary doctrine has repeatedly been applied to medical
devices); McPheron v. Searle Labs., Inc., 888 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The
great weight of the authority in other jurisdictions is to the contrary [to Plaintiff’s
assertion]; most courts have found that a medical device which must be prescribed
and inserted by a physician falls under the learned intermediary doctrine.”);
Philips Combs & Andrew Cooke, Modern Products Liability Law in West Virginia, 113
W. VA. L. REV. 417, 438 (2011). In fact, West Virginia is the only state that has
completely rejected the learned intermediary doctrine. See State ex rel. Johnson &
Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 906, 914 (W. Va. 2007).
317. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Baker v.
Danek Medical, 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 881 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
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under the learned intermediary doctrine, the question before the
court is whether the plaintiff established that his or her surgeon
would not have used the device if he or she had received an
318
adequate warning.
The rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine is set forth
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts as follows:
[O]nly health-care professionals are in a position to
understand the significance of the risks involved and to
assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given
form of prescription-based therapy. The duty then
devolves on the health-care provider to supply to the
patient such information as is deemed appropriate under
the circumstances so that the patient can make an
319
informed choice as to therapy.
The reasoning behind the learned intermediary doctrine is
perhaps even more persuasive when medical devices—rather than
prescription drugs—are involved because it is not reasonably
conceivable that an individual could implant a device that requires
a trained surgeon and “it is highly likely a patient and doctor spend
considerably more time discussing the risks and benefits of a
surgically implanted device than they would discussing the risks
320
and benefits of routinely prescribed prescription drugs.”
Although the learned intermediary doctrine has traditionally
been applied to the warnings a manufacturer has provided in
product labeling and package inserts, it also is equally applicable to
321
the warnings that sales representatives provide. As one court in a
jurisdiction that has adopted the learned intermediary doctrine has
stated “any duty to warn exists only between the manufacturer and
the plaintiff’s surgeon, not between the plaintiff and the sales
322
Thus, claims alleging that a sales representative
representative.”
failed to adequately warn a plaintiff about a device’s risks have

318. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 483 F. App’x 909, 912 (5th Cir. 2012).
319. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) & cmt. b (1998).
320. See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
321. For examples of cases applying the learned intermediary doctrine to
allegations involving the conduct of a medical device manufacturer’s sales
representatives, see Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270,
1286–87 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Beale, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1366–78; O’Connell v. Biomet,
Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1281–82 (Colo. App. 2010); Kennedy v. Medtronic, Inc., 851
N.E.2d 778, 784–86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
322. Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11-dp-20521, 2011 WL
3047794, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011).
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323

generally failed.
Some courts have recognized that a dispositive motion based
on the learned intermediary defense may be defeated if there is an
issue of fact related to a sales representative’s actions or
representations. However, the learned intermediary defense may
still be successful subsequently at trial. For example, in Hurley v.
Heart Physicians, P.C., the plaintiff admitted that the warning
provided by a pacemaker manufacturer in its technical manual was
adequate, but asserted that advice given by a sales representative to
the physician contradicted the manual and nullified the warnings
324
contained in the technical manual.
Specifically, a pacemaker
sales representative was asked by the plaintiff’s cardiologist to
attend an examination of the plaintiff “to test the battery in her
325
pacemaker” and “to make adjustments” as needed.
At the
examination of the plaintiff, the sales representative found that the
326
battery was low and needed to be replaced as soon as possible.
The plaintiff’s mother refused to consent to the replacement and
327
insisted that the plaintiff no longer required the pacemaker. The
physician asked the sales representative for options to determine
328
The sales
whether the plaintiff required the pacemaker.
representative stated that one option was downward adjustment to
329
the rate of the pacemaker, which would also conserve battery life.
330
The
The physician decided to adjust the rate downwards.
plaintiff subsequently suffered a cardiac event and resulting brain
331
damage.
The trial court granted the defendant manufacturer’s motion
for summary judgment based on the learned intermediary
332
doctrine. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the
trial court, finding that a material question of fact existed as to
whether “the warnings given by the . . . representative were
consistent with the manual and, therefore, the trial court
improperly determined that the defendant was entitled to prevail
323. See, e.g., id.; Wolicki-Gables, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87; O’Connell, 250 P.3d
at 1281–82.
324. 898 A.2d 777 (Conn. 2006).
325. Id. at 780.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 781.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 782.
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under the learned intermediary doctrine as a matter of law.” The
Connecticut Supreme Court focused on the presence and
involvement of the representative with the adjustment to plaintiff’s
pacemaker:
What is at issue . . . is whether, notwithstanding the FDA
approved written pacemaker replacement warnings, [the
representative], by his oral communications to [the
cardiologist] that turning down the pacemaker was an
option, accompanied by his physical adjustment of the
pacemaker . . . actually contradicted the manual, thereby
334
vitiating and nullifying the manual’s warnings . . . .
Because the Connecticut Supreme Court found that this was a
question of fact, the case was remanded to the trial court for
335
further proceedings. The trial was limited to the issue of whether
the representative’s oral statements and adjustment of the
pacemaker were for “diagnostic” purposes or whether they “actually
contradicted” the technical manual and therefore nullified the
336
accompanying warnings.
The case was tried before a jury and,
337
The
after a twenty-six day trial, a defense verdict was returned.
jury specifically found that the sales representative’s actions did not
338
nullify the written warnings.
The plaintiff appealed to the
Connecticut Supreme Court, but the verdict was upheld on
339
Thus, although the trial court opened the door to sales
appeal.
representative liability even where a learned intermediary defense
was proffered, the defense ultimately prevailed at trial.
Moreover, a few courts have recognized an “overpromotion”
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine that is largely
dependent on the conduct of a manufacturer’s sales
representatives. Under this exception, which has typically been
applied in the prescription drug context, a few courts have called
into question the application of the learned intermediary doctrine
where drug salesmen encouraged physicians to prescribe a drug by
providing information that contradicted the warnings, thus
allegedly influencing a physician to prescribe a drug more freely

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 779.
Id. at 786–87.
Id. at 789.
See Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 3 A.3d 892, 899–900 (Conn. 2010).
See id. at 898–99.
See id.
Id. at 896, 912.
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340

than the physician otherwise would.
However, in Beale v. Biomet,
Inc., the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a device
manufacturer’s overpromotion of a knee implant created an
341
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine. There, the court
ruled that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing that the
manufacturer’s sales representatives influenced the implanting
doctor to inappropriately select patients for the device; thus, the
learned intermediary doctrine shielded the manufacturer from
342
liability.
B.

Absence of Duty

Several courts have been unwilling to find that a sales
representative’s presence in an operating room during the
implantation of a medical device creates an additional duty to
343
For example,
provide certain advice or warnings to a physician.
in Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc., the court rejected the
plaintiff’s attempt to impose an affirmative duty on a sales
344
representative present during the implantation of a pain pump.
The plaintiff’s negligence action against the sales representative
“alleged breach of the duty to use reasonable care in the
345
instruction and education of physicians.”
The court found that
even if the sales representative did have some interaction with the
surgeon during the surgery, he did not have a duty to affirmatively
tell the doctor while he was performing the surgery how to use the
346
device.
The court, therefore, granted the sales representative’s
motion for summary judgment, reasoning:
The undisputed facts show that [the sales representative]
did not participate in the decision-making during [the]
procedure. [His] role was limited to carrying “back up”
products in their sterile packages to have available for the

340. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975);
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973); Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr.
183 (Ct. App. 1964); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971); Baldino v.
Castagna, 454 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), rev’d, 478 A.2d 807 (Pa. 1984).
341. 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377–78 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
342. Id.
343. See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1291–92
(M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011); Kennedy v. Medtronic,
Inc., 851 N.E.2d 778, 786–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
344. Wolicki-Gables, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1291–92.
345. Id. at 1279.
346. Id. at 1291.
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surgeon’s use, if necessary, and to observe preparation
of the products. [He] did not “scrub in” for the
procedure . . . and did not enter the sterile field. . . . [The
surgeon] testified that the decisions made while he
347
performed surgery were his own decisions.
Another example of a plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to
impose an affirmative duty on a sales representative is evident in
348
In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the
Kennedy v. Medtronic.
manufacturer of a pacemaker and its leads owed the patient “a duty
to refrain from providing a pacemaker . . . and participating in the
[surgery] once [the representative] discovered the procedure was
349
being performed in a setting that was not part of a hospital.” The
plaintiff alternatively pled that the manufacturer had voluntarily
assumed a duty of care for the decedent by sending a
350
representative to the surgery.
The pacemaker manufacturer’s
clinical specialist was present at the surgery “to provide technical
support and ensure that the [pacemaker’s] lead parameters were
351
correctly calibrated and the lead was functioning properly.”
In affirming the trial court’s granting of summary judgment
for the manufacturer, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that the sales representative voluntarily undertook a duty outside of
the limited role he had agreed to perform, which was to ensure the
352
leads were properly calibrated. The court also held that no duty
of care existed for the manufacturer because the plaintiff’s injuries
were not reasonably foreseeable and the burden and consequences
of imposing a duty on the manufacturer would be “substantial,” as
it “would be a significant burden to require [the manufacturer] to
353
monitor the conditions under which a doctor performs surgery.”
The court opined:
It would be unreasonable, and potentially harmful, to
require a clinical specialist . . . to delay or prevent a
medical procedure simply because she believes the setting
is not appropriate or the doctor is unqualified. To hold
otherwise would place a medical device manufacturer . . .

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id.
Kennedy, 851 N.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id. at 786.
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in the middle of the doctor-patient relationship.
Similarly, in rejecting a plaintiff’s attempt to impose an
affirmative duty to prevent a doctor’s misuse of the company’s
products, another court recognized “[i]t is both impractical and
unrealistic to expect . . . manufacturers to police individual
operating rooms to determine which doctors adequately supervise
355
their surgical teams.”
A small handful of courts, however, have imposed a duty on a
sales representative when the representative is present during a
surgical procedure and assisting with some aspect of the surgery.
For example, in Zappola v. Leibinger the court held that the written
instructions for a device to close a cranial bone flap did not satisfy
the manufacturer’s duty under the learned intermediary doctrine
where the medical device sales representative recommended the
product to the physician without conveying certain
356
recommendations contained in the device’s instructions.
In
Zappola, the defendant sales representative was present at the
357
plaintiff’s surgery to remove a brain tumor.
Based on the size
and location of the tumor, the plaintiff’s surgeon decided he could
not use the representative’s medical device to reattach the
358
plaintiff’s bone flap as planned.
The surgeon specifically asked
the sales representative “to observe the size of the cranial defect in
359
[the plaintiff’s] skull.”
The surgeon and the sales representative
then discussed possible methods of closing the skull, and, during
this conversation, the representative suggested another of the
360
manufacturer’s products.
When the surgeon expressed concern
about using the device based on his past experience, the sales
representative told the surgeon that the device “had been
361
improved.”
The surgeon used the product, which ultimately
fragmented, causing the plaintiff a cerebrospinal fluid leak and
362
four additional surgeries.

354. Id.
355. Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1987)
(pharmaceutical case).
356. Nos. 86038, 86102, 2006 WL 1174448, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 2006).
357. Id. at *2.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at *3.
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The defendant manufacturer argued that it satisfied its duty to
warn the surgeon because the written warnings that accompanied
the product provided instructions and guidance regarding closing
363
a cranial defect like the plaintiff’s defect.
The court disagreed
and found that the key factor was that the sales representative was
present in the operating room and observed the plaintiff’s
condition:
Although
the
written
instructions
[provided
recommendations for use], [the sales representative] did
not make these recommendations to the doctor. Despite
the fact that he was professionally obligated to inform
[the surgeon] about the use of the product and personally
observed the size of [the plaintiff’s] cranial defect, [the
sales representative] did not uphold his duty of ensuring
364
that the product was used properly.
In essence, the court in Zappola imposed a duty on the
defendant sales representative to inform the surgeon about the
uses of the product, in part because the representative affirmatively
recommended the product after observing the plaintiff’s cranial
365
The case was tried and a jury found the plaintiff’s
defect.
surgeon, the medical device manufacturer, and the sales
366
representative liable for negligence.
Under similar circumstances, the court in Chamian v. Sharplan
Lasers, Inc. found that the manufacturer “provided a technician to
assist in the surgery, and, by doing so, assumed a duty to [the
plaintiff] to ensure that the technician . . . was knowledgeable
about the equipment and competent to provide technical
367
assistance to physicians using the equipment.”
The defendant
manufacturer’s technician was present during plaintiff’s plastic
surgery to test the device, make sure that it was working properly,
and assist the physician by entering and adjusting settings as
368
directed by the surgeon. During the surgery, the physician asked
the representative to recommend appropriate settings for the
369
device, which the representative provided.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
2004).
368.
369.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *6.
See id. at *6.
See id. at *1.
No. 200000171, 2004 WL 2341569, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 24,
See id. at *3.
See id. at *5.
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In both Zappola and Chamian, the courts appeared to place
great significance on the fact that the physician consulted with the
sales representative during surgery regarding medical decisions
relating to the device at issue. The presence of the sales
representative in the operating room was also a major factor.
However, as the next section will show, other courts have taken a
different view, finding that physicians are the “captain of their ship”
and thus responsible for all medical decisions that they make.
C.

Captain of the Ship Doctrine

The captain of the ship doctrine relies on many of the same
justifications as the learned intermediary doctrine and provides
that a “licensed physician is the principal or master while
370
performing medical services within a hospital.”
On the other
hand, hospital personnel assisting under the surgeon’s control are
borrowed servants, and thus, the surgeon is liable for their
negligence once he or she assumes control in the operating
371
room.
An example of application of the captain of the ship
doctrine to medical device sales representatives is evident in
O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., where the Colorado Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court’s decision that a sales representative present
during a surgical procedure was an agent of a doctor, who was the
372
“captain of the ship” and in control of the surgery.
The court
described the roles of the surgeon and the sales representative:
The sole purpose of [the sales representative] being in the
operating room was to provide [the surgeon] with
information about the [device], which information [the
surgeon] then used to make his medical judgments. That
is, [the surgeon] remained in control of the surgery vis-àvis [the sales representative] and all other non-physicians
in the operating room. Because [the surgeon] remained
in control of the surgery, anything [the sales
representative] might have done during that surgery,
including any advice he allegedly gave or should have
given to [the surgeon], was done as a crew member, so to
373
speak, of the surgical ship.
Because the sales representative in this case was the doctor’s agent
370.
371.
372.
373.

O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Colo. App. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1283–84.
Id.
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during the surgery and the plaintiff settled his claims against the
doctor, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
374
the claims against the sales representative.
Courts have applied the reasoning behind the captain of the
ship doctrine to defeat claims attacking a sales representative’s
375
statements for failure to warn. In Hall v. Horn Medical, L.L.C., the
plaintiff alleged that a sales representative negligently represented
to a doctor that an intradiscal cage device could be used without
performing a bone graft, despite the fact that the written warnings
accompanying the device explicitly stated that the device was
376
intended to be used with a bone graft. Plaintiff sued the surgeon
for medical malpractice and the sales representative for negligent
377
misrepresentation. The implanting doctor testified that he would
not have implanted the device without a bone graft if the sales
representative had not told him that this was an acceptable off-label
378
use.
Not surprisingly, the sales representative denied ever
recommending the device for a use that was not only off-label, but
379
affirmatively contraindicated by the written warnings.
However,
the court found that—even if the sales representative told the
implanting doctor that he could use the device without a bone
graft—any reliance by the doctor on that statement was
380
unreasonable as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned “[a]s a seasoned neurosurgeon, it is patently
unreasonable for [the implanting surgeon] to rely on a sales
representative’s opinion about the type of procedure that should
381
be employed in operating on a patient’s spine.”
Accordingly, because a physician is the “captain of the ship”
when it comes to making medical decisions regarding a patient’s
surgery, defendant manufacturers will want to argue that any
reliance on representations made by a sales representative—who
has neither the medical experience nor education of a physician—
about issues dealing with medical care is per se unreasonable.

374. Id. at 1284.
375. See, e.g., Hall v. Horn Med., L.L.C., No. 11-1032, 2012 WL 1752546 (E.D.
La. May 16, 2012).
376. Id. at *1–3.
377. Id. at *1.
378. Id. at *3.
379. Id. Promotion of off-label use is strictly prohibited by federal regulations
and sales representatives have been prosecuted for violation. See supra Part II.
380. Hall, 2012 WL 1752546, at *3.
381. Id.
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Lack of Causation

Challenging causation has also been an effective defense for
medical device manufacturers facing claims based on the conduct
of their sales representatives. It is a basic principle of tort law that a
plaintiff must show that a defendant’s actions proximately and
382
Accordingly, courts have
actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.
been disinclined to allow claims to proceed past summary
judgment where the plaintiff cannot show that a sales
representative’s mere presence in an operating room was causally
383
related to the injury the plaintiff suffered. This is especially true
if the sales representative did not participate in the decision
making during the procedure and if his role was primarily to
384
provide technical support.
For claims attacking instructions or
representations that a sale representative made, the plaintiff must
allege and show that the sales representative’s alleged negligence
caused the plaintiff’s injuries, rather than some other cause such as
medical malpractice or a defect in the device—the latter of which is
385
Causation arguments have also
often found to be preempted.
been successfully asserted by defendants against allegations that
they failed to adequately report adverse events, even if a sales
386
representative is present at a surgery.
A defense based on causation is also available to defend
against a failure to warn claim where the “failure of the
manufacturer to provide the physician with an adequate warning of
the risks associated with a prescription product is not the
proximate cause of a patient’s injury [because] the prescribing
382. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 26–28 (2010).
383. See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1291–92
(M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011).
384. See id. at 1291 (“The undisputed facts show that [the sales rep] did not
participate in the decision-making during [the] procedure. [His] role was limited
to carrying ‘back up’ products in their sterile packages to have available for the
surgeon’s use, if necessary, and to observe preparation of the products. [He] did
not ‘scrub in’ for the procedure . . . and did not enter the sterile field.”).
385. See Adkins v. Cytyc Corp., No. 4:07CV00053, 2008 WL 2680474, at *3
(W.D. Va. July 3, 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint because it was equally
possible that faults in the medical device caused plaintiff’s damages rather than
negligent instruction by the physician); see also supra Part III (discussing
preemption in the context of medical device cases).
386. Cf. Rollins v. St. Jude Med., 583 F. Supp. 2d 790, 803–04 (W.D. La. 2008)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims that defendant manufacturer failed to properly
report adverse events unrelated to plaintiff’s surgery because plaintiff failed to
allege how this alleged failure caused her injuries).
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physician had independent knowledge of the risk that the adequate
387
In other words, “the
warning should have communicated.”
causal link between a patient’s injury and the alleged failure to
warn is broken when the prescribing physician had ‘substantially
the same’ knowledge as an adequate warning from the
388
manufacturer should have communicated to him.” Therefore, to
succeed with a failure to warn claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the alleged warning that the sales representative should have
provided concerned a matter outside of the physician’s knowledge.
Furthermore, some courts have taken an even more expansive view
and found that “a medical device manufacturer has no duty to warn
physicians of a device’s dangers which the medical community
389
generally appreciates.”
Courts have also generally recognized that plaintiffs cannot
show causation where the physician testifies that he or she would
have still prescribed the drug or device even with a stronger
warning, such as when the physician never read the warning that
390
accompanied a device.
However, courts are sometimes hesitant
to let a device manufacturer off the hook just because a physician
did not read materials accompanying the device. In the recent
decision in Bonander v. Breg, the court refused to grant summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s strict liability and failure to warn claims
despite the fact that the doctor who inserted the pain pump in the
plaintiff’s shoulder testified that he did not read the pain pump’s
391
package insert. The court in Bonander ruled that there remained
a genuine issue of fact whether warnings from, inter alia, the
defendant’s sales representatives to the physician would have
387. Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 1995); see also
Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting
Christopher, 53 F.3d at 1192).
388. Christopher, 53 F.3d at 1192; see also Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d
1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he manufacturer cannot be said to have caused
the injury if the doctor already knew of the medical risk.”).
389. Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 723 N.E.2d 302, 312 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999).
390. See Johnson v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 02-1328 JTNFLN, 2004 WL 742038, at
*10 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2004) (finding that where the physician testified that he
never saw the warnings that accompanied the device, causation for plaintiff’s
failure to warn claim does not exist as a matter of law); cf. Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358
F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] product defect claim based on insufficient
warnings cannot survive summary judgment if stronger warnings would not have
altered the conduct of the prescribing physician.”).
391. Bonander v. Breg, Inc., No. 09-2795 (JRT/JJK), 2012 WL 4128386, at *4
(D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2012).
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392

prevented the plaintiff’s injuries.
One particularly problematic
aspect of this opinion is that the physician testified that he did not
rely on medical device companies to provide information regarding
393
the risks and benefits of a medical device.
In essence, this
opinion states that if there is any chance that the implanting
physician possibly could have heeded a different warning, then a
plaintiff’s claims may be able to survive a motion for summary
judgment. Thus, while causation arguments generally may provide
a safe-haven for medical device manufacturers faced with claims
involving sales representative conduct, the manufacturer should be
aware of exceptions that may exist in the applicable jurisdiction.
In a recent medical device case involving claims against both
the medical device manufacturer of an intrathecal neurostimulator
and the sales representative, the defendants argued that the
learned intermediary doctrine precluded plaintiffs’ claims, the
defendants did not owe a duty to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs did not
present evidence that any representations made by the sales
394
representative in the operating room caused plaintiffs’ injuries.
Plaintiffs’ original petition alleged that “[a]s a result of the
fraudulent and negligent acts of Defendants Medtronic, Inc. and
[Medtronic’s representative], the Plaintiffs suffered permanent and
395
irreversible injuries.”
Specifically, the defendants “intentionally
misrepresented the efficacy and necessity of their Medtronic
medical device,” causing the plaintiff to undergo an unnecessary
396
surgical procedure.
The plaintiffs alleged that Medtronic’s
representative told the plaintiffs “that he was there to make
everything safe” and he and another representative “portrayed
themselves as medical consultants and made recommendations” to
397
the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also sued the implanting physician, Peter
398
Lotze. Medtronic and its sales representative moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ physician, Dr. Lotze, was
responsible for all patient, clinical, medical, and surgical decisions

392. See id.
393. See id.
394. See Defendants Medtronic, Inc. & Stuart Ison’s Traditional & “No
Evidence” Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law at
2–3, Howton v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 2009-47341 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 2011)
[hereinafter Defendants’ Traditional & “No Evidence” Motion].
395. Plaintiffs’ Original Petition at 3, Howton, No. 2009-47341 (July 27, 2009).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 10.
398. See id. at 26–27.
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and, thus, the learned intermediary doctrine barred plaintiffs’
399
Defendants also attacked the plaintiffs’ negligence
claims.
claims, arguing that Medtronic and the sales representative owed
no duty to the plaintiffs and there was no evidence establishing the
400
element of causation.
Plaintiffs countered that the learned intermediary doctrine did
not apply to this case because there was a direct misrepresentation
regarding the medical device’s alleged dangerous propensities to
401
the consumer.
Plaintiffs also argued that their claims were not
402
The case
negligence claims, but were instead fraud claims.
ultimately went to trial on the question of whether Medtronic and
403
its sales representative committed fraud against the plaintiff.
After an approximately one-month long trial, the jury found
Medtronic and its sales representative not liable to the plaintiffs for
404
fraud.
While the plaintiffs were able to avoid application of the
learned intermediary doctrine, absence of duty, and causation
defenses to their claims by couching them as fraud claims instead
of negligence claims, this strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful at
trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medical devices are becoming increasingly complex in
technology and often require specific training or special knowledge
or experience to be used effectively in patient treatment. Further,
physicians are faced with several competing options in terms of
medical devices available for a particular patient condition. It is
not surprising then that medical device representatives are
increasingly requested to attend surgeries or to offer technical
information, support, or assistance regarding the device. The
399. See Defendants’ Traditional & “No Evidence” Motion, supra note 394, at
9, 27–28 (referring to the district court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ Notice of Partial
Nonsuit of Defendant Peter Lotze, M.D., Howton, No. 2009-47341 (Mar. 18, 2011),
which dismissed Lotze).
400. See id. at 30, 32–35.
401. See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants Medtronic, Inc. & Stuart Ison’s
Traditional & “No Evidence” Motion for Summary Judgment at 12–14, Howton,
No. 2009-47341 (Apr. 18, 2011); see also Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply to Defendants
Medtronic, Inc. & Stuart Ison’s Reply in Support of their Traditional & “No
Evidence” Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–6, Howton, No. 2009-47341 (Apr.
26, 2011) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply].
402. See Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply, supra note 401, at 1.
403. See Jury Charge at 3, Howton, No. 2009-47341 (June 3, 2011).
404. See id.
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increasing technical need for medical device sales representatives
coupled with an increase in government enforcement actions and
post-Riegel civil products liability actions involving sales
representative conduct is rapidly changing liability issues faced by
medical device sales representatives.
Not only must medical device manufacturers be aware of new
claims related to their sales representatives, but the manufacturers
and their outside counsel must develop new defenses and defense
strategies. An analysis of recent relevant case law reveals several
practical steps that a manufacturer and its counsel can take to assist
in the defenses of these claims. For example, coordination
between counsel handling government enforcement actions and
civil products liability actions is key to consistent positions and
defenses for the manufacturer. In addition, it is possible that
individual sales officers or directors may have counsel or may need
counsel separate from that of the manufacturer, with whom
coordination will also be necessary, particularly as it relates to any
testimony by the sales officer or director. Depending on the
procedural posture, products liability counsel may want to
approach the court regarding coordination in terms of timing of
discovery and trial with the government enforcement action.
Further, outside products liability counsel must be prepared to
move to exclude or limit evidence of irrelevant government
enforcement actions in civil actions.
At the outset of a case, counsel should examine the complaint
to determine if removal to federal court is possible based on a
fraudulent joinder argument as to the diversity-defeating sales
representative. A fraudulent joinder argument is most likely to
succeed in cases where: (1) the complaint lacks detailed allegations
as to the sales representative; (2) the learned intermediary
argument is particularly strong in the applicable jurisdiction; (3) an
affidavit from the sales representative or the prescribing physician
establishes that there is no colorable claim against the sales
representative; and (4) the sales representative is not considered a
seller and could not otherwise be held liable under the applicable
state products liability statute.
Further, as a first line of defense in products liability actions
involving sales representative conduct, when a PMA-approved
device is involved, counsel should consider an early dispositive
motion based on Riegel preemption. Counsel should be aware of
the most recent decisions both within the jurisdiction and outside

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

69

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

1156

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

the jurisdiction and be ready to distinguish those cases finding an
issue of fact. Cases involving detailed allegations of actual actions
taken or representations made by the sales representative,
particularly in the off-label promotion context, may be more
difficult to resolve on a preemption dispositive motion.
Should a Riegel-preemption argument not be feasible or
successful, manufacturers and their counsel should be prepared to
proceed to discovery with an eye towards establishing support for
key defenses to claims involving sales representatives: the learned
intermediary doctrine, captain of the ship, lack of duty, and lack of
causation. There is no general consensus among the courts
regarding application of the learned intermediary doctrine or the
captain of the ship doctrine, and arguments regarding duty and
causation fall on both sides of the liability spectrum. Ultimately,
each case must be examined closely based on the facts to
determine if there is a real danger of liability based on the
representative’s involvement in the patient’s care. In recent years,
there have been few sales representative cases that proceeded to
trial, but those that have met with overall success for
manufacturers. Keys to success for either a dispositive motion—
based on the learned intermediary doctrine, captain of the ship,
lack of duty, and lack of causation—or at trial, not surprisingly,
include strong testimony at deposition by the sales representative as
well as the prescribing physician. Understanding the nuances of
the applicable jurisdiction’s case law related to these defenses in
advance of these key depositions is necessary in order to obtain the
helpful testimony needed. Even if a dispositive motion or trial is
not successful, manufacturers and their counsel have been
successful challenging the verdicts or negative decisions of the trial
courts on appeals.
Consequently, while the increase in government enforcement
actions involving sales personnel and the post-Riegel environment
have given rise to novel claims and liability concerns involving sales
representatives, manufacturers and their counsel can defend and
resolve these claims successfully through preparation and novel
defense strategy approaches.
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